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Conclusion
American Diplomatic Relations With Korea (1866-1910)
Korea Is a peninsula extending out from the mainland 
of Asia, hounded on three sides by the sea and on the north 
by the Maritime Province of the Far Eastern Republic and 
Manchuria. Its seventeen hundred miles of seacoast is rugged 
and dotted with many mountainous islands and good harbors.
The largest port is Fusan, one hundred and sixty-three miles 
from Nagasaki, Japan. It is a thriving commercial center 
with a population of over a hundred thousand. The capital, 
Seoul, is situated in about the center of the country and 
it has a population of over three hundred thousand.
Korea is about the size of New York state. Its climate 
and density of population is closely akin to that of the east­
ern part of the United States in the same latitude. The prin­
cipal industries are mining, agriculture, and fishing with 
much of the joining in hands other than Korean. Korea is rich 
in natural resources which are ample enough to support her 
population. Due to the exclusiveness of the country the for­
eign elements have never settled there as much as in China.
In 1919, the foreign nationalities in Korea totaled as follows: 
Japanese, 350,000; Chinese 16,682; Americans 687; English 230; 
French 97; Germans 53; Russians 14. Practically all of the
Americans in the country are either missionaries or are en-
1gaged in the mining industry.
1. C. v/. Kendall, "The Truth about Korea”, in the NewLarned History, (Springfield, Mass., 1923), p.5014
The position of Korea made it well nigh impossible far 
her to escape her ultimate fate* Her unfortunate location 
between the two great powers of China and Japan was respon­
sible for keeping her in a constant state of invasion, vas­
salage and tribute* With the penetration of Russia, another 
factor entered which was to lead eventually to war and final­
ly to Korean annexation to Japan. Korea was absolutely neces­
sary for Japan’s future welfare; likewise, it was necessary 
to achieve Russia’s aim for an all year around ice free port 
on the Pacific. The result was inevitable.
In discussing accidental relations with Korea it is well 
to go back to the year 1777. In that year, Roman Catholic 
Christianity entered Korea by way of Peking where Korean stu­
dents had come in contact with the Jesuits. Gradually the 
doctrines spread, until in 1836, when the first French mission­
ary penetrated the country in disguise, there were thousands 
of believers. By 1864, no fewer than nineteen Frenchmen had 
passed the barriers of the frontiers in disguise, or landed at 
night on the coast. Some, of course, died in the attempt but 
others were always ready to carry on. The period from 1864 
to 1868 may be called the turning point in the history of mod­
ern Korea, when both internal and foreign affairs began to 
culminate.^
2. W. E. Griffis, ,,CoreaM, in Cyclopedia of Political 
Science. Political Economy, and~~tintted states 
History. ('New-York, 1904}, P» 649.
Hie year 1866 marked the real beginning of American 
relations with Korea. At the, beginning of that year the 
Korean Government began a persecution of the Christian mis­
sionaries and natives in that country. Three bishops and 
seventeen priests were put to death as well as many of the 
native converts. The missionaries, with few exceptions, were 
French subjects. The result of this persecution was the dis­
patching of the French Asiatic fleet to Korean waters.3
Before Admiral Rose reached Korea, the American steamer 
General Sherman went to that country on a trading expedition.
It had on board three Americans, two British subjects, and a 
crew of nineteen Manila men as sailors.4 The vessel entered 
the Ta-Tong River and sailed up it to the vicinity of Ping-An, 
Where a few days afterwards the.entire crew was killed and the 
vessel burned. The news of the. disaster of the General Sherman 
was transmitted to Anson Burlingame by Admiral Rose on the re­
turn of the French squadron from its preliminary reconnoitaring. 
Burlingame immediately notified the State Department of the oc­
currence and, at the same time, protested to Prince Kung, the 
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Korea was considered as
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1866, 
{Washington, 1867), PP* 536-W. "*
4. Ibid. 1867, pp. 415-16.
5. Ibid., p. 426.
Burlingame to Seward, Dec. 15, 1866: "It is my
painful duty to Inform you that the United States 
schooner General Sheman, while on a trading voy­
age to Corea was destroyed and all on board mur­
dered by the natives. The news was brought to 
Chefoo by Admiral Rose of the French fleet
a tributary state of China but Kung disavowed all responsibil­
ity for the Koreans and stated that the only connection between
6the two countries was one of ceremonial.
Burlingame also reported the case to the American admir­
al on the Asiatic station with the suggestion that he inquire 
into the facts and report on the same to the government at 
Washington for instructions. The British admiral was like­
wise notified by the British Minister to China. In vie\7 of 
the strained situation that was arising in regard to Korea and 
the possible concentration of a large French and British naval 
foree, Burlingame wrote to Secretary of State Seward:
colleagues have written to their admirals 
and I suppose in the spring there will be a 
large fleet in Korea, The issue of all will 
be the opening of the country. If my advice 
can have weight, it will be that our presence 
there will father restrain than promote aggres­
sion and serve to limit action to such satis­
faction only as great and civilized nations 
should# under the circumstances, have from 
the ignorant and the weak." 7
Seward investigated the matter and, having satisfied 
himself that Burlingame’s fears were unfounded, and that no 
hostile steps were being contemplated, assured the American 
Minister that no such measures were necessary.
In the meantime, however, the French charge dT affaires 
to China, M, de Belionet, had taken a high handed attitude
6* Diplomatic Correspondence, op. cit., p. 426.
7. Ibid., p. 426.
towards the Chinese Government over the massacre of the 
Christian missionaries in Korea* He told Prince Kung that 
the French were going "to march to the conquest of Korea” 
and that the "vacant throne” would be at the disposal of 
the Emperor of the French* Kung, of course, refused to 
recognize the French claim* Nevertheless, de Bellonet kept
up an arrogant and war-like correspondence for the evident
8purpose of intimidating the Chinese Government*
On October 5, 1866, Admiral Rose, who had returned to 
Korea, proclaimed a blockade of the Seoul River, This 
seemed to embolden de Bellonet still further with the result 
that he sent the following note to Prince Kung:
"*•*•.Your imperial highness is probably ignorant 
that war* which for us is- a pleasure, which the 
French passionately seek, is far from being detri* 
mental to the people at large***the people of Corea 
are far from being hostile* • *(they} address us as 
their deliverers*"9
8* Diplomatic Correspondence* .op, cit., p* 420
M . cT<TBelXonet to Prince Kung, July 13, 1866:
"The government of his Majesty cannot permit 
so bloody an outrage to be unpunished* The 
same day upon which the King of Corea laid 
his hands upon my unhappy countrymen was the 
last of his reign; he himself proclaimed its 
end which I in turn solemiSy declare today*
In a few days our military forces are to 
march to the conquest of Corea, and the Emper­
or, my august sovereign, alone, has now the 
right and the power to dispose, according to 
his pleasure, of the country and of the vacant 
throne*"
9* Ibid, p*'423*
Prince Kung, evidently not knowing what to make of the 
French charges bellicose communications, turned to Minister 
Burlingame for advice. Burlingame told him that he had done 
nothing that was wrong and that If such action "called forth 
menaces, he could rest strong In the consciousness of good 
intentions, and submit, with confidence, the correspondence 
to the impartial judgment of the civilized world." ^
Immediately after this conversation, the correspondence 
of M. de Bellonet and Prince Kung was sent to each of the 
foreign legations in Peking* This embarrassed the French 
charge to such an extent that he accused Prince Kung of "ig­
norance of international and diplomatic usages" for publishing 
11their notes*
The Freneh expedition to Korea suffered a crushing defeat 
at the hands of the Koreans who greatly outnumbered them. They 
then considered sending another expedition to Korea and evident­
ly had the approval of Seward who made a verbal offer to coop­
erate with the French to obtain from the King of Korea satis­
faction for the murder of the nationals of their respective 
10* Diplomatic Correspondence, op. cit., p* 419*.
11. Ibid, p. 424
"de Bellonet to Kung, November 25, 1866:
"I have already had occasion many times to say 
to your excellencies that your ignorance of 
diplomatic and international usages has caused 
you to take steps and these have been wrongly 
interpreted in B’urope. That which you have 
just done, in submitting our correspondence on 
the subject of Corea to the representatives of 
the powers in Peking, comes under this category.
countries. This second expedition was never sent and the
United States mis saved from what might have been an entang- 
12ling venture.
Seward now turned to the question of a treaty with the 
King Of Korea. His nephew, George F. Seward, American consul- 
general at Shanghai, reported the presence of some Korean en­
voys ifiio‘had indicated a willingness on the part of'their gov­
ernment to enter into a treaty. He requested 3eward*s permis­
sion for a commission to repair to Korea to attempt neg^itt-
•» 3tions. His request was granted and he was given a letter 
from President Johnson to the King, and was authorized to pro­
ceed to Korea, supported by a naval force, "to procure a treaty 
of amity and commerce as nearly similar in its provisions to 
those existing between the United States and Japan as may be 
found practicable and expedient.” ^
12. Tyler Dennett, Sewards Far Eastern Policy, in
American Historical Review, October 1922, 
pp. 54-57*
George H. Blakeslee, Recent Foreign Policy of the 
United States, (Mew ^ork, 1925) p. 1.94.
Foster R. DulYes7'“Amgrica in the Pacific (Cambridge 
1932) p. 85
13. Foreign Relations of the U. S., (Washington, 1871)
pp. 336-W7” George F. "Sewafd to William H. 
Seward, April 24, 1868: "I respectfully propose
,,..to proceed to Corea in order to ask for an 
official explanation of the Shaman affair, and 
to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of amity and 
commerce similar to those now existing with China 
and Japan, or such other lesser treaty as may be 
expedient and attainable without exercise or 
show of force.”
Foreign Relations. 1870, pp. 336-39.
Despatches to Consuls, Vol. 49, p. 267, quoted in
Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, pp. 419-20.
In the instructions given to Seward the aims of the 
United States were set forth:
"The design of this government is to render your visit 
a generous and friendly one,.reserving the question of 
force, if found necessary,. for ultimate consideration. 
You will not he expected therefore to direct the exer­
cise or make any display of force by way of intimidation, 
but oh the other hand you will be expected to practice 
discretion, prudence,,and patience, while firmly assert­
ing the dignity and maintaining the demands of the 
Unfibed States., You will, however,. give notice to the 
Korean Government* if you find it expedient, that this government cannot suffer the outrage committed in the 
case of the General Sherman to remain indefinitely 
without receiving proper guarantee of adequate and 
ample redress.!1
The proposed expedition of George Seward was never under­
taken for he discovered that he had been dxiped by the so-called 
Korean envoys and that they did not represent the government 
of the peninsula kingdom.. Rather, their purpose had been to 
steal some burial relics held in great veneration by the ruler 
of Korea. Mr., Qppert, the leader of the party claimed that the 
ultimate purpose of the expedition in gaining the possession of 
the relics was to extort a treaty of commerce from Korea and to 
make commercial intercourse the price for the return of the 
stolen bones, corpses, and ancestral tablets., The party was 
surprised by the Koreans at their work and driven off. Among 
the group was an American named Jenkins who went along as an 
interpreter and who also furnished most of the capital., Seward 
now investigated Jenkin's connection with the expedition and 
determined to bring him to tried., He was tried in the United 
States Consulate Court in Shanghai and charged with "making an
15. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 420
unlawful and scandalous expedition to Corea, and of violently 
attempting to land in a country with which tho united States 
had no treaty relations." tonkin’s was* however* acquitted 
<bn a technicality. Qppert* the leader, could not ho tried
as he was a citizen of the North Goman Confederation.
In 1667, the U* 8* 3* tTachusetts visited Korea for the
purpose of investigating the Sherman affair and in 1888, the
U, S. S. Shenandoah made a visit for the same purpose* neither,
however, accomplished anything. It 1g interesting to note
that the captain of the Caohueetts m s  Commander Robert Xh
Simfcldt who was to figuro prominently in negotiating our
17first treaty with Korea in 1Q82.
The failure of the Uachusetts and Shenandoah expeditions
did not dotor the United States from continuing to try and open
relations with Korea* On October 14, 1868, George Seuard wrote
to Secretary of State Seward:
"France has boon unfortunate in Corea. Great Britain 
has hardly a groatsr interest at stake than no, and 
no grievances to redress* ITorth Germany, with her 
Increasing corxicrco and groat floeto of coasting 
crafts, has yet no determined policy in tho East,
Foreign Relations* op, clt*, p* 337 
Nation, Vol. 30, April 8, 1830, p* 271
The nature of the technicality on Which Jenkins 
was acquitted cac not given.
17. Charles Oscar Paullin, Ulploraatio negotiations of
American Naval Officers, (Bul“€ I S c r l e T a ) pp. 
284-86,
We are favourably known, and all the circumstances 
indicate that an attempt to open the country may best 
be made by us.M 1®
This prompting by Seward was ignored until 1871* In that 
year* Admiral Rodgers suggested the sending of a naval expedi­
tion to that country for the purpose of opening it to foreign 
intercourse, The American Government finally decided to make 
the attempt to negotiate a treaty and to entrust the negotia­
tions to Mr* F* F. low, the American Minister to China, and
19to furnish him With a naval escort* Low thereupon requested 
the good offices of the Chinese Government in sending a letter 
to the king of Korea which would serve as an introductory ex­
planation of the mission* He was notified by the Chinese that 
Korea was an independent country insofar as relations with for­
eign governments were concerned. China took this course so as
to be able to disclaim any responsibility should trouble arise
20out of the negotiations* In discussing Korea during this 
period it is necessary to include China due to the relationship 
existing between the two countries* This relationship is hard 
to define for v&ile Korea paid an annual tribute to Peking and 
was therefore a vassal state yet*, in cases involving foreign 
expeditions, interventionSj and other external relations,
Korea was supposed to be competent enough to be able to handle 
Foreign Relations, op* clt., p. 338
19. James D* Riehardson, A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the"~Presidents, (Washington,
W a y ,  Vol. vil, p.~T£5
20 • Foreign Relations* 1871-72* p. Ill
H i
her own affairs. The writer will endeavor to show this
relationship as clearly as possible during the course of
this paper. Perhaps the true relationship between Korea and
China may be best expressed in modern language by say}4g that
Korea was one of the "self-governing dominions"; of the Chinese 
21Empire*
Low’s instructions were to secure a treaty looking to 
the protection of shipwrecked mariners. Furthermore, should 
a favourable opportunity appear for the obtaining of commercial 
advantages, the; proposed treaty was to include provisions to 
that effect. 22 v
21* Edward Thomas Williams * A Short History of China 
(N.Y. 1928), p. 5587 : ‘
22. Ibid, pp. 334-35. Secretary of State Fish to Low, 
April 20, 1870: "It has been decided to auth­
orize negotiations to be had with the author­
ities of Corea, for the purpose of securing 
a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked 
mariners, and to intrust the conduct of the 
negotiations to you. Should the opportunity 
seem favourable for obtaining commercial ad­
vantages in Corea, the proposed treaty should 
include provisions to the effect; but the 
President principally aims in this mission to 
secure protection for such seamen of the United 
States as may unhappily be wrecked upon those 
shores.♦..The Department relies upon you, in 
fulfilling these instructions, to exercise 
prudence and discretion, to maintain firmly 
the right of the United States to have their 
seamen protected, to avoid a conflict by 
force unless it cannot be avoided without 
dishonor, and to seek in all proper ways the 
harmonious and friendly assistance of the 
Chinese Government*"
Low was loath to undertake the mission for he was 
convinced in his own mind that it was useless and not worth 
while. He had endeavoured to get what information on the 
country that he could but with little sueoess; he was doubt- 
ful if the good offices of the Chinese Government would prove 
of much value; he Was not "sanguine" over the results of the 
expedition. However, Admiral Hodgers saw the brighter 
side of the affair for he said;
"The anticipations Vary very much as to the 
reception we shall probably meet. I will 
hope, until facts dispel hope, that we shall 
meet with success. The time has come, I 
infer from What I learn, for the Koreans 
to make a treaty; and if we do not succeed 
now, some other power or powers will probab­
ly be more fortunate."
On the 30th of May, 1871, Low and Bodgers with six Amer­
ican war vessels, arrived at the mouth of the Han Biver, some 
thirty miles below Seoul. Thoy were immediately visited by 
some Koreans who came on board to ascertain the object of the 
expedition. They were informed that Mr. Low had important 
business to transact with their government, sfliich could be 
made known only to a person of equal rank with the Minister 
and who would also have to be a representative of the king* 
They were further told that it was the desire of the United 
States to establish friendly relations with Korea and that
g§they were not there to make trouble.
23. Foreign Relations. (1870-71) pp. 362-63
24» Asiatic Squadron Letters, 1870-1871, p. 309, 
quoted in Paullin. on. cit. p. 288.
25* Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 116-121.
On June X, 1871, a surveying party was sent up the
river to take soundings. They were fired on by the natives
and in the ensuing fight two- American sailors were wounded
and twenty or more Koreans killed and wounded* 26 low
immediately demanded, an apology but it was not forthcoming*
Both low and Bodgers decided to bide their time so as to give
the Koreans ample opportunity to Confess their errors and,
incidentally, to strengthen their own preparations in case
no.'redress was made. The American representatives did not
Seem.to realise that they had probably been in- the wrong in
sending out a survey party in a foreign country* especially
one with which m  had ao relations whatsoever*
The king of Korea did not send an apology but he did
send a letter which evaded the issue and which showed that
he did not want to make a treaty with the Bolted states. H e •
denied all responsibility for the Sherman affair and cited
the instance of good treatment accorded to the shipwrecked
sailors of the American ship Surprise in 1868.- low did not
deign to reply.
On June 10, 1871* the retaliatory expedition started up
the river*. The work that it was sent to do was accomplished,
Five forts were taken* which with the munitions found in them,
26* Ibid* pp. 121*24,
27. Pauliin, pp. elf*, pp. 290*91
The Suroiae was wrecked on the coast of Korea 
shortly before the arrival of'the General Sherman. 
The crew was treated with civility"and’ kindness 
being returned to China by way of Mukden and 
Nleuchang, See Biol, Correspondence. 1867,pp. 4X8-X?.
were completely destroyed. About two hundred and fifty 
Koreans were killed while the American losses were three kil­
led and nine wounded. That the Koreans put up a stubborn 
resistance can bo ascertained from Low’s report of the fracas?
"The Coreano fou^it with desperation, rarely equalled, 
and never excelled by any people." 38
On June 15, Low addressed a despatch to the king request­
ing an audience and telling him of the aims of the United 
States, but it was not forwarded by the Korean officials who 
were afraid to do so after the recent fighting. Low then sent 
another despatch to the court saying that he desired to commun­
icate with the king or a high minister and threatening a "pro­
longed stay in the country" if he did not receive an answer.
29This note also was not answered.
Low, sensing the futility of the mission, left Korea on 
July 3* 1871. All his efforts had failed to induce the native 
government to enter into any negotiations with a view to con­
cluding a treaty. He said: "All the evidence obtained goes
to prove that the government of Corea was and is determined to 
maintain its original status*-non intercouse with any western 
nation, and hostile resistance to all attempts of foreign gov-
ItQemments to establish relations for whatever purpose."
He was fully disgusted for he observes: "As the case now
stands, foreign governments.should decide either to let Corea 
alone* and allow her to burn* pillage, destroy, and massacre
28. Foreign Relations, op, cit. p. 128
29. Ibid., pp. 139-41
30. Foreign Relations, op cit. p. 142
all who come within her reach without question or demand 
for redress*, or organize and send such a force as will be 
able to insure success* without unnecessary risk# in breaking 
down the barriers that stand in- the way of intercourse. Mo 
further efforts at conciliatory negotiations should be made, 
nor should mere demonstrations of force be attempted in the 
expectation that favourable results will follow.” 3i
Secretary of State Fish’s reply to low’s report was 
rather nan-commitai although he did reprimand the American
Minister for threatening a "prolonged stay in the country*”
32until his note to the king was answered*. .
After the return of the Low-Bodgers expedition, the 
United States inaugurated a hands-off policy* as far as 
Korea was concerned* for several years. The visits of the 
french and American squadrons and their withdrawal without 
accomplishing their purposes cannot be said to have raised 
the prestige of Europeans with Korea. Bather* it was looked 
upon as a victory in defense of the sovereignty of that coun­
try.
The Japanese were the next to make the attempt to pene­
trate into Korea* To no part of the mainland of Asia did 
Japan lay any claim except that Korea, until 1838, had been 
accustomed to pay tribute to Japan as Well as to China. 33
30. Foreign Relations, op cit* p. 142
31. Ibid. p,"X47
32. Ibid, (1872-73} p. 12935* W*B, Griffis* Corea, the Hermit Nation, (N.Y. 1907) 
pp* 58, 159* 372’, cited from Tyler Bennett * Amer­
icans in Eastern Asia, M* Y. 1928) p. 429
After many rebuffs, they were finally successful in 1876 in 
signing a treaty of intercourse and commerce* The Chines© 
Government was sounded as to its disposition toward such a 
treaty hat it disclaimed any control of the kingdom in its 
treaty relations * By the terms of this treaty the indepen­
dence of Korea was recognized hy Japan, three Korean ports 
were thrown open to Japanese trade, and an accredited Japan* 
©so Minister was to reside in Seoul* Its moat important 
clause was the one acknowledging the integrity and indepen*
dance of the Korean kingdom and thus disavowing the vague
34but traditional Chines© suzerainty over that country*
This furnished an entering wedge for Japan., which already
had fairly definite ideas as to her future expansion and
penetration of Asiatic territory* "Thus the door was opened
to foreigners and the beginning of Korea*© loss of sovereign-
j) 35ty was inaugurated*
In 1874* the American charge d*affaires at Peking re­
ported the removal of the regent of Korea from office, This 
was the ruler Who had successfully defied the Asiatic squad­
rons of France and America and who was, in large part, res­
ponsible for the continual isolation of the * hermitT kingdom# 
This report had it that the American assault on the Korean 
forts in 1871 had had a telling effect on the regent*© pol-
34* Bennett, o£ cit., p. 455
John, w, Foster* American Bluloma.cy in the Orient* 
{Boston, 1903),' pTHoT*"" ' '
0,. S, -Congressional Record, ?ol, 58* 66th Congress 
Ist“”session*~ part T , 1919, p* 5599,
35, Leo Pasvolsky* Russia in. the Far East, (N, !.♦, 1922), p, 2X1 ! - —  ■ •
icy of ©xclnsioft^ae in a way responsible for bis downfall.
The Japanese-Korean treaty of 1876 again encouraged
tbe American Government to make overtures to Korea, In
April 1878, Senator A. A* Sargent of California introduced
a resolution into tbe United States Senate, authorizing the
President to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with
37Korea, Wwith the aid of tbe friendly offices of Japan*n
However, nothing came of this proposal although tbe friendly
offices of the Japanese Government were unsuccessfully tried
for at a later date*
Korea and Japan, despite their treaty of 1876, were not
on the friendliest of terras. It seems highly probable that
the treaty was helped along considerably by the presence of a
large number of Japanese marines who accompanied tbe treaty
commission. In 1878, rumors of coming difficulties between'
38the two countries reached the American Minister in Feklng.
36 • Foreign Relations, 1874-75, pp. 253-54 "Wiliams to Fish, March 30, 1874:
"He (the informant was a Roman Catholic bishop 
who had fled the country) reports that tbe dis­
astrous and bloody result to the Coreans of our 
attack on Fort McKee was used as a strong argu­
ment with it (the Regent) of tbe uselessness of 
bis resisting foreign nations, whose weapons and 
tactics were so superior to theirs, and their 
resources so great."
37. Paullin, op. cit., p. 295
United States Congressional Record, Vol. 7, part 3 
1877-78, p. 23ST“
38* Foreign Relations, 1878-79, pp. 131-32.
Whatever the trouble was it seems to have blown over and in
1079, the Korean Government opened the port of Gensan to
Japanese trade. Commenting on the treaty opening this port,
our Minister to Japan, L'r. J. A. Bingham, said: "With the
exception of China end Japan, Corea seems indisposed to hold
39treaty relations with foreign powers*”
In 1830, an attempt to negotiate with the Korean Govern- 
raent was mad© by Cojxio&orc Robert W. Shufeldt. Shufeldt had 
visited Korea on the n. s. S. Wachusetts in 1867 in an endeav­
or to Investigate th@ Sherman affair, hut, as has been pointed 
out, was unsuccessful. Now it was his purpose to work through 
the Japanese foreign office. In answer to his request,
Shufeldt was refused a direct letter to the Korean Government 
but did get one addressed to the Japanese consul, at Fusan, one 
of the three treaty ports open to Japan in Korea. On arriving 
at this port, Shufeldt gave the Japanese consul a letter which 
he asked to be forwarded to the king of Korea. This missive 
set forth the American aims with regard to Korea but the Korean
governor of the district refused to forward the letter and
40Shufeldt returned to Japan.
H© n©xt tried to send a letter to the king of Korea
39. Ibid., p. 696
40. John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law,
(Washington, 19037T?ol* 5,” p.' 569 Kobert V/. Shufeldt, Cruise of the Tlconderoga, II 
pp. 327-348, cited from PaulXin. op citTT 
pp. 296-297.
through the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was 
also returned with the explanation that it was wrongly addres­
sed and also that the Korean Government was not desirous of 
having any foreign relations with other countries except 
Japan.
The effects of these rebuffs upon shufeldt was that he
felt that Japan was not acting in good faith. It was his
contention that Japan Intended to acquire all the rights and
42privileges in Korea and to keep all foreigners out. Al­
though his belief was daily being strengthened that he would 
receive no help from Japan, he did not give up hope. Through 
the Chinese consul at Nagasaki he got in touch with Li Hung 
Chang, Viceroy of Chihli and one of the most potent figures 
in Chinese life. Li invited Shufeldt to come to Tientsin and 
discuss the situation. The Commodore accepted and, on his ar­
rival, he asked Li to use the influence of China in helping to 
secure a treaty of amity and commerce with Korea. Li assented 
to Shufeldtfs request and promised to do all that he possibly 
could. At the same time Li "expressed the hope that ....my
41. Shufeldt, Ticonderoga. II, pp. 417-418, cited from
Pauliin» op cit.7 pp. £97-98.
Korean Minister of Ce&emony to the Japanese Minis­
ter of Foreign Affairs: "It is well known to the
world that our foreign relations are with Japan, 
neighboring to us, which have been maintained 
since three hundred years, and that other foreign 
nations are not only situated far from us, but 
there has never been any intercourse with them."
42. Ibid, p. 296.
government would permit me to assist China in the organiza-
45tion of its navy.” Of course there m s  a purpose to the 
ready acquiescence of Li to the proposals of ghufeldt and, 
as a tense situation existed with Russia at the time, he 
thought that by helping to negotiate a treaty between Korea 
and the United States it would be possible to create a new 
great power in Korean affairs that would offset the threaten­
ing dominance of Russia in Manchuria and Korea. It is entire­
ly probable that he feared Japanese designs in the peninsula 
44kingdom also.
With this encouragement Shufeldt returned to the United 
States on the U. s. S. Ticonderoga whose period of foreign 
service had expired. The commodore seems to have had some 
imperialistic ideas as to America^ destiny in the Pacific 
and to have also had a sense of the importance of Korea out 
of proportion to its actual value. He even went so far as 
to suggest to Secretary of the Navy, Thompson that one of the 
good points of a treaty with Koraa would be the protection
43. Shufeldt, Ticonderoga, II, pp. 466-470, quoted in
Paullin, bp cltT7 PP* 299-301 
Moore, op. cit., p. 569
44. Dennett, American Choices in the Far Hast in 1882,
American Historical Review, Vol. 30, October ’ 
1924, p. 94"The efforts of China indeed, to establish re­
lations between Corea and the United States, 
arose from her desire to throw so important 
and so exposed a fragment of her territory under 
the moral protection that might possibly come 
from treaty stipulations with western states."
afforded that country against China, Russia, or Japan* ~
One wonders what Shufeldt thought a treaty of commerce and 
aaity meant? Fortunately, he m s  only speaking for himself 
and not for the Government of the United States*
On Hovember 14, 1881, Shufeldt was ordered to return to
China and renew his efforts if he should he satisfied that
he "would not meet with another repulse". The main points of
his negotiations were to he the relief of American vessels
Which might he shipwrecked on the Korean coast; to obtain
trade rights at the Korean ports open to foreign commerce;
to ask for most favoured nation treatment; freedom of travel
in the interior for purposes of trade; and such privileges
of extra-territorial jurisdiction as were enjoyed by China 
46and Japan.
Shufeldt did not return to China as the commander of an
45. Shufeldt, Ticonderoga* II, pp. 484-481, cited from
Paullin, oj>. cit. p. 303
"The acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutian 
Islands, the treaties with Japan, Sandwich Is­
lands, and Samoa, are only corollaries to the 
proposition that the Pacific Ocean is to become 
at no distant date the commercial domain of 
America....If any means can now be found to get 
beyond the barred gates and to reach the central 
government, I am convinced that Korea could be 
made to understand not only the policy of a treaty 
with the United States, but its absolute necessity 
as a matter of protection against the aggressions 
of surrounding powers. Corea would in fact be 
the battlefield of any war between China and Russia 
or Japan in whichever way the nations might con­
front each other."
46. Moore, op. cit., pp. 569-70.
American war vessel but as the naval attacks’ of the Amer­
ican legation in Peking. At first he found Li lukewarm to
47the proposed treaty but eventually a Korean envoy arrived 
with the news tbat Korea was now willing to negotiate a 
treaty with the Uhited States. The change in front of the 
Korean Government can be attributed to the personal desires 
of the Emperor of China and the King of Korea. Both of 
these rulers were now anxious that the treaty be promulga­
ted as soon as possible as they were getting more apprehen*
48sive in regard to Japanese designs in the peninsula. Even 
Li* wham Shufeldt thought did now show enough enthusiasm over 
the proposed agreement* was more in favor of his plans than 
the Commodore thought,t The American representative had first 
however, to enter into negotiations with Li before he could 
make the trip to Korea.
On March 2, 1882, Shufeldt held the first of a series 
of conferences with Li. The commodore refused the first 
draft of the proposed treaty Which stated that '’Chosen, be­
ing a dependent state of the Chinese Empire, has neverthe­
less heretofore exercised her own sovereignty in all matters
4,7 • Korean Letter Book* pp. 17-20, 42-44, 46, cited 
from'Paullln, op. cit.. p. 310 
"It would seem "that Li1s purpose was to play 
off the United States against England for "it 
was known that the Viceroy had urged the British 
Minister at Peking to inaugurate a negotiation 
with a view to a treaty between England and 
Korea*"
48. Paullin, oj>. cit.. pp. 311, 314.
of internal administration and foreign relations." Li 
stated that the above article was necessary and that it was 
written in at the behest of both the Chinese Government and 
the King of Korea* Shufeldt contended that the United States 
had the right to treat with Korea as a sovereign state inde- 
pendent of the over-lordship of China.
However* Shufeldt cabled Secretary of State* Frelinghuysen 
for instructions as to whether he should agree to the inclu­
sion of the proposed article in the treaty. He received no 
reply so, when on March 10, Li agreed to waive the contentious 
article if the commodore would accept the company of a Chinese 
representative to Korea and also if he would state that his 
purpose in doing so was to ask for the good offices of China
in completing the Korean treaty, Shufeldt agreed and the artl-
, _ , . , 50cle was deleted.
Shufeldt^ next step was to depart for Korea for the for­
mal signing of the treaty. He boarded the U. S. S. Swatara 
aiid anchored off the mouth of the Salee River on May 12, 1882. 
On May 22, the treaty with Korea was signed by the envoys of 
both countries. Thus the peninsula kingdom finally entered in­
to treaty relations with an occidental power for the first
51time in its long existence.
49. Paullin, on. cit.. pp. 311-516
50. Ibid., pp. 316-19
51. Ibid., pp. 518-22
Many of the authorities in dealing with the American- 
Korean treaty seem to have the impression that Li Hung 
Chang was not any too friendly toward the proposed agree­
ment. From the "Memoirs" of this statesman one gathers 
that he was strongly in favor of it. In discussing the re­
moval of the ex-regent from Korea to China shortly after­
wards he has the following to say:
"Furthermore, let it be noted for the benefit of 
history that an escort of my own men accompanied 
the American naval officer jshufeldt] to Chemulpo, 
the entire party being carried in a ship belonging 
to me personally, and Commodore Shufeldt carrying 
from me one of the strongest letters that I have 
ever written. That letter was directed to Li 
Hsia Ying, acting King of Korea, who was urged—  
if he cared for the friendship of the Viceroy of 
Peohihli— to bring his Government to the signing 
of the document carried by the American naval 
officer. The treaty was signed; and now the Amer­
icans, because I invite the Tai-Wen-Run to be the 
guest of China, call ay actions highhanded— be­
cause he was the American’s friend." 52
The above seems to discount the allegations made here­
tofore in regard to Li*s withholding of support of the treaty. 
It will be recalled that the Tai-Wen-Kun was the ruler of 
Korea during the time of the French and American expeditions 
and was probably more responsible than anyone else for the 
isolation of that kingdom.
Two days after the signing of the treaty, Shufeldt re­
ceived a letter from the King of Korea to the President of
52. Memoirs of Ll-Hung-Chang, edited by William Francis IfiannTx, (Kew York, 1913) p. 255.
the, United States* This missive stated that Korea was a
dependency of China but sovereign in the exercise of her
55home and foreign affairs. The paradoxical relations be­
tween the two countries were still ii^force* The letter to 
the President, however, was promptly pigeon-holed and never 
officially published in any record. 54
The Amari can-Korean treaty was one of peace, amity, and 
commerce and navigation and contained fourteen articles.
Some of its parts are interesting and worth quoting due to 
the fact that it was the first treaty negotiated with a wes­
tern power and also because it was designed to give the United 
States the foothold it had sought in Korea since 1866:
55* Korean Letter Boole, p. 79, cited from
 ^ T a l l in :  opT c it* .  p . 322
Uhited States Congressional Record, ¥ol. 19, 
part 9, 50th Congress, 1st Session, 1887-88, 
p. 8138
54* Dennett, America in Sastern Asia, p, 464 
This treaty was negotiated during the 
time of the anti-Chinese agitation in 
the United States and exclusion was 
becoming a major issue. Dennett says:
"While the treaty was ratified, it 
was perhaps not exactly welcomed by 
Secretary of State Frelinghuysen.
To the declining popularity of the 
Chinese in the United States may per­
haps be assigned the reason why the 
letter of the King of Korea to the 
President expressing dependence upon 
China, was promptly pigeon-holed and 
never officially published in any re­
cord."
Article 1
There shall be perpetual friendship be­
tween the United states and the King of 
Chosen and the 'citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.
X t  other powers dead unjustly or oppress- 
ively with either Government * the other 
will exert their good offices* on being, informed of the case, to bring about m  
ami.cable arrangement* thus showing their 
friendly feelings*
Article ..II ;
After the eon elusion of this treaty of 
amfcty and commerce, the high contracting powers may each appoint diplomatic re­
presentatives to reside at the Court of 
the other, and may each appoint consular 
representatives at the ports, of the other 
Which are open to foreign commerce* at their own convenience*
The Diplomatic and-Consular representa­
tives -of the two Governments, shall re­
ceive mutually all the privileges, rights, 
and immunities, without discrimination* 
which are accorded to the same classes of 
representatives from the most favoured nation.
Article X I X
Whenever United States, vessels, either 
because of stress of weather or by want 
of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the 
nearest open port in Chosen, they may 
enter any port or harbor.,..,
Tyler Dennett#- Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese 
War, |Garden Cisy, i h Y. i m ® T T ? T W & *  
Dennett states that "This article had been 
drafted by hi Hung Chang and §hal Li ap­pears to have thought by the insertion of 
this article to have bound the TJ* S* to 
help China to retain the suzerainty of the 
peninsula."
If a United States vessel be wrecked on the 
coast of Chosen, the local authorities, on 
being informed of the occurrence, shall im­
mediately render assistance to the crew, pro­
vide for their present necessities, and take 
the measures necessary for the salvage of the 
ship and the preservation of her cargo#
Article VI
American citizens are not permitted either to 
transport foreigi imports to the interior for 
sale or to proceed thither to purchase native 
products# Hor are they permitted to transport 
t native produce from one open port to another
open port#
Other important provisions fixed the tariff rates, pro­
hibited any business In opium, and gave the American consul 
in Korea extra-territorial jurisdiction#
In 1882, shortly after the signing of the treaty, an 
insurrection occurred in Korea# The trouble seems to have 
been inspired by political differences as there were two 
parties involved— one opposed to the foreigners and the 
other in favor of progress from a foreign source# The leader 
of the rebels was Tai-Wen-Kun, the. ex-regent and father of 
the reigning king. The revolt was the result of a conspiracy 
that was directed against all foreigners but the Japanese es­
pecially who were to be exterminated or expelled, and against 
the king who was considered too amenable to foreign influence# 
The legation of Japan in Seoul was attacked and a number of 
Japanese killed# China, fearing the consequences, rushed a 
force into Korea which took the ex-regent prisoner# Tai-Wen* 
Kun was immediately transported to China where he could not
56* Senate Executive Document 47# 48th Congress, 2nd
Sess*, pp. 216-221. Henry Chung, Korean Treaties 
(K. Y. 1919) pp* 197-203# ‘ ’
stir up any more trouble, This was the incident previous­
ly referred to in the "Memoirs" of Li Hung Chang.
In a proclamation issued by the commanding officer of 
the Chinese forces in Korea, it was stated that Korea was 
a dependency of China* notwithstanding this clear cut avow­
al of Chines© sovereignty over the peninsula kingdom, the 
Japanese ignored the Government of China and proceeded to 
deal directly with the Korean Government. A large force of 
Japanese troops was landed in the country, the legation was 
reestablished, and a treaty of peace made with Korea. Under 
the terms of this treaty, Korea agreed to arrest the ring­
leaders of the insurrection and bring them to trial; the 
Japanese were allowed to send deputies to assist the Korean 
officials in making the arrests; the Koreans were to pay an
indemnity of 0500,000; and the Japanese were to be allowed
57to maintain a legation guard in Seoul for a year.
That Japan desired to be the chief power in Korean af­
fairs is apparent in her Ignoring of China in this regard.
Also we need only recall their attitude in forwarding Shufeldt* 
letters to Korea to make the claim appear sounder. An ack­
nowledgment of the suzerainty of China would have retarded 
her plans but an independent Korea would be far easier to 
deal with. Tho country of the Mikado had not as yet, come to
China Despatches. Vol. 61, Ho. 27, 1882, cited from
57. Tyler Dennett, American Choices in the gar East 
in 1882, in American Historical Review, Vol.
30, Oct., 1924, p. 90.
58a true realization of the weakness of China*
During the Korean revolt, an American warship had been 
despatches to that country hut its only accomplishment was 
the effect that such a vessel would have on the wrangling 
powers in contributing to the peaceful settlement of affairs. 
The Japanese considered the American vessel in the li$vfc of 
an intruder hut the Koreans and the Chinese were quite 
friendly.
In the meantime the treaty with Korea was awaiting
ratification. On December 26, 1882, Minister John Russell
Young at Peking sent the following to Secretary of State
Frelinghuysea in regard to the Shufeldt treaty:
"I think it very important that the Daited States 
should have a footing in Corea* and that, having 
opened the door, we should not close nor give 
any other power precedence.
I look upon our conventions with these Asiatic 
powers as tentative* We have very little to lose 
whether Corea becomes a province of China or is 
annexed to Japan or remains independent. The 
only power whose presence in Corea would affect 
our trade would be Russia, as the policy of Russia 
would be to open trade channels overland and limit 
the seaboard commerce*
Our convention with Corea is, commercially, a step 
in the path of progress, and made ....with the view 
of extending into Asia the advantages of our civili­
zation* With the other powers it is political, and
58. Ibid, p. 91. American Minister to China Young to 
Frelinghuysen, Oct. 2, 1882: "In the ease of Japan,
furthermore, it is said that her policy towards the 
Koreans has not always been conciliatory. It has 
for some time been a tradition in Japanese politics 
that Japanese influence should be paramount in Corea. 
Some of Japan’s ambitious statesmen have been cred­
ited with a desire to annex Corea.”
is bound up with aims and sokemes of western nations 
for aggrandizement in Asia. As we have no interest 
in these enterprises, as we have at heart the inde­
pendence of Asiatic nations, I am anxious to see our 
country in a position where her moral influence can 
aid in maintaining the existing autonomy of China,Japan, Corea, and Siam.” 59
The above is noteworthy because it shows more than any 
other document brought to light up to this time the policy 
of the United States* The American Government wanted a 
foothold In Korea for the purpose of acquiring trade advan­
tages but we were going to do business in a fair manner. 
Although the ‘United States recognized the independence of 
Korea, it did not intend to interfere in its domestic or 
foreign affairs. Korea would he the chief beneficiary of a 
treaty as it would thus be open to the advantages of western 
civilization and we were not as grasping as the other occiden 
tal powers which had acquired footholds in the Orient. How­
ever, Young contradicts himself in his despatch by saying 
that the United States cared nothing for what happened to 
Korea and then In the last sentence he is "anxious” to see 
the United States in a position where it can help Korea to 
maintain its independence*
She reference made to Russia is very significant. From 
it one would gather that that country was also making an ef­
fort to acquire a foothold in Korea. Eight years previously, 
the American Minister to China had mentioned Russia in rela- 
59* Foreign Relations (1883-84$, p. 172
t.ioa to Korea twit at that time nothing had come of Russo-
00Korean negotiations* fhat Russia was due to become inter* 
ested in her southern neighbor was a foregone conclusion 
on account of their contiguity and also because the harbor 
of Vladivostok was ice hound for several months of the year* 
Russia*s constant aim to secure an ail year round open water 
port is too important a consideration to be lost sight of. 
Korea, in possession of a power hostile to Russia, would he 
not only a harrier to warm water, hut also to southern mar* 
jcets* Whoever controlled Korea could also control the Japan 
Sea and the approaches to Vladivostok* Without Korea, Russia 
had no assurance that she could hold even 'what she had already 
obtained in Siberia, much less penetrate into Manchuria.
Russia was not, as yet, ready to move in but it was only a 
question of time before she would endeavor to do so*
Minister Young, in the same despatch, reported China 
and Korea had signed a treaty, the importance of which is 
shown in the first sentence of the draft which defined the
60*Foreign Relations (1874*75), P» VJZ.“l^ioanTSiiHster to China Williams to Fish, March 50, 
1874: "It appears that a Russian man-of-war had
come to the eastern coast of Corea in 1864, which 
remained there a long time for the purpose of open­
ing negotiations with respect to the new frontier be­
tween the countries of Russia and Corea, near Port 
May and Possiet, but her mission was unsuccessful."
See also Congressional Record, Vol. 7, part 3, 45th 
Congress, End Session, 1877-78, p, 2601.
exact relationship which existed between the two countries; 
"Corea, having been from ancient times, a tributary state, 
the canons of her intercourse in all matters with the 
government of China are fixed and need not to be changed.61 
' Finally, on January 9* 1883, the United States Senate 
ratified the Korean treaty and it was proclaimed in force
ftPby both countries on June 4, 1883. up. Lucius Foote 
arrived in Korea on Hay 13, 1883, on the U. S. S. Monocacy 
and immediately entered upon his duties as the accredited 
American Minister to Korea. He received a cordial welcome 
and was very pleased with his reception. He said: "They
63seemed to understand and appreciate our policy in the East."
On December 4, 1883, President Arthur in his third an­
nual message to Congress had the following comment to make 
on the treaty;
"Korea, as yet unacquainted with the methods of western 
civilization, now invites the attention of those inter­
ested in the advancement of our foreign trade, as it 
needs the implements and products which the United States 
are ready to supply. We seek no monopoly of its com­
merce and no advantages over other nations, but as the 
Chosenese, in reading for a higher civilization, have 
confided in this republic, we cannot-regard with indif­
ference any encroachment oh their rights."
This announcement, when coupled with the second part 
of Article one of the treaty, would seem to justify the asser­
tion that Shufeldt had previously made. Was President Arthur1s 
Foreign Relations. (1883-84) p. 173 
62. Moore, oj>. cit., p. 570
« Foreign Relations (1883-84) p. 241 
64. Richardson, oj>. cit., VIII, p. 174
declaration to be construed as a desire on the part of the 
Unitea States to intervene, in case of trouble, to uphold 
the sovereignty of Korea? While the two announcements are 
imperialistic in wording, the American policy in the follow- ■ 
ing years was far from reinforcing the statements of the 
commodore and the president*
In July 1883, the Korean Government decided to send a 
mission to the United States and the Icing selected Mr* Min- 
Yong-Ik and Mr* Hong-Yeng-Sik as his representatives. They 
carried a letter to President Arthur which showed the pleas­
ure of the Koreans over their treaty with the United States;
"The people of our countries having entered into 
friendly intercourse with each other* and having 
both on our side and yours, bound themselves mutally 
to continue these happy sedations, we pray that the 
people of both our lands may live forever, without 
change, in peace and happiness."
President Arthur, in his reply,stated the satisfaction
of the United States:
"...♦The United States, from their geographical posi­
tion, are, of all others,, the nation with which the 
orientals should oultivate friendship and a commerce 
which will prove to them and to us alike beneficial 
and profitable, and which must certainly increase."
The Korean embassy returned to Korea on the U. S. S.
Trenton and arrived in Seoul in June 1884* Accompanying
them was Ensign George H* Foulk, United States Navy, who
was to be the naval attache at the American legation in
6®* Foreign Relations* {1883-84), pp. 249-50.
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with Franc©.68 It is pertinent to note here that altho the 
U. S. appointed a minister to Korea, the other powers did not. 
While the action of the U. S, ranked Korea with China and 
Japan, Great Britain appointed a consul-general, responsible 
to Peking; Germany and France respectively, appointed a consul 
and a coramiseiiaH both of which were responsible to the home 
office* 69
It was in 1884 that the Korean Government asked for 
.American army officers for the purpose of training native 
troops. Both the President and Congress were favorable to 
the request but; it was several years before these officers 
arrived in Korea. 70
In the same year the -political tranquility of Korea was 
again disturbed by another insurrection* It was inaugurated 
by the attempted assassination of Min-Yong-Ik at a dinner
66* Congressional Record, Vol. 58, Part 6, 66th Congress, 
1st Session, 1019, p. 5599.
69. Dennett, America in Eastern Asia, p. 475
7-G. Ibid., Vol.' 17, part"'2," 49’th" Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 1-2. Richardson, o£. cit., -VIII, pl>, 330. 
Cleveland to Congress, 1st Annual Message, Dec.
8, 1885: opportunity has been omitted to
testify th© friendliness of this Government 
towards Korea, whose entrance into the family of 
treaty powers the United States were the first 
to recognize* I regard with favor the applica­
tion made by the Korean Government to be allowed 
to employ American officers as military instruc­
tors to which the assent of Congress becomes nec­
essary and I am happy to say that this request 
has the current sanction of Japan and China
given by Hong-Yeng-Shik* his colleague In the embassy to 
the United States. An alarm of fire was given in the course 
of the dinner Which caused all the guests to go outside.
The ruse was successful and a group of men fell upon Min- 
Yong-Uc and inflicted several wounds on his person. The 
other Korean offioials seeing the wounded man and realizing 
its significance, divested themselves of their robes and 
rushed away. The plot seems to have been the work of a par­
ty of students who were enraged at some reforms which Min- 
Yong-Ik had instituted since his return from the United 
States *
The next move of the rebels was to direct their ener­
gies against the Japanese residents in Seoul* A large num­
ber of Japanese were killed and much of their property des­
troyed. In commenting on the trouble, Foote said: "Several
Japanese) came to the legation for refuge and I gave direc-
71tions that all who came should be admitted." The trouble 
reached such proportions that the Japanese legation was again 
fired and the Japanese forced to leave the city for Chemulpo. 
The American and other ministers were called together by the 
King of Korea and asked by His Majesty to intercede for him 
with the Japanese Minister then at Chemulpo and state that 
he desired to maintain friendly relations with Japan. . The 
ministers agreed to do as requested but they accomplished
71. Congressional Record, op. cit. pp. 331-35.
tjonothing in their interview with the Japanese representative.
Shortly after this occurrence, Foote appointed Lieuten­
ant Foulk as acting minister, an office Which was soon
changed to the rank of charge d* affaires. 73
In the meantime, China had become engaged in a war with 
France. As a result of this and the Korean revolt* Japan 
demanded concessions equal to those of China In Korea and 
also demanded that Korea declare Its independence of China.
For the present these demands were granted*
Foulk handled the affairs of the United States with 
great tact and dignity While he was the acting American rep­
resentative in Seoul* In 1885, he reported the arrival of a
72. Congressional Record, op* city pp.,533-334
73. Tyler Dennett, Early American Policy in Korea in
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. JdCVIlf, March
i'923, pV "The DipTonatic and Consular Act
of July 7* 1884* had reduced the rank of the 
post in Seoul to that of Minister-Resident and 
Consular-General. Mr. Foote, upon being in­
formed of his reduction in dignity, resigned.
The Department of State requested him to take 
his departure on leave so that it would not be 
necessary to explain to the Koreans that the 
post had been reduced. Foote therefore departed 
as if he were merely going on leave. This reduc­
tion of rank is significant of American policy.
The position appears to have been created some­
what hastily in January or February 1883, when 
little was known about Korea. The fact that 
the salary was not reduced leads one to suspect 
that here was an indication that the Amerioan 
Government was reconsidering Its policy and 
showing a disposition to seek a less conspicu­
ous role. The fact that not even a Minister- 
Resident appeared at Seoul for another year and 
one half and that the diplomatic duties were 
left entirely to Foulk is further indication 
that the United States was seeking to avoid the 
assumption of influence which the King and other 
interested parties were seeking to thrust upon it."
74Russian Charge* on a Russian warship. in 1886, he offered 
his resignation and Mr. William H. Parker was appointed Min­
ister-Resident to sucoeod him. Trouble occurred again soon 
after Parker*s arrival with the result that marines from 
American, French, and Russian warships were sent up to 
Seoul to guard the legations. Foulk was recalled to Seoul 
to replace Parker who had proved himself utterly unfit for 
the position, Foulk evidently was in favor of Korean inde­
pendence and against Chinese suzerainty* As a result of 
this, Yuan-Shi-Kai, the ranking Chinese official in Korea, 
and the Korean party friendly to China worked for his remov­
al. Yuan also seems to have been the principal party who
was responsible for the trouble which had occurred shortly
75after Parker assumed his post. Yuan and his party propos­
ed to Denby, the American Minister to China, that diplomatic 
relations with Korea would be better if conducted through 
Peking. This course was approved by Benby but Secretary of
76State Bayard disapproved of it and declined to consider it. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese Government continued the demand
74. Foreign Relations, (1884) p. 358.
75. Congressional Record, Vol. XIX, part 9, 50th Con-
gross, 1st Session, 1897-88, p. 8139.
76. 76 China Despatches, Oct. 12, 1885, cited from
Pennett.' Early American Policy, op. cit*, p. 99
for Foulk* s recall until they accomplished bheir aim.
Bayard approved bis conduct but, because he was persona 
non grata, ordered him to report back to the navy.77
In April 1885, Great Britain occupied .Port Hamilton 
off the southern coast of Korea. Ostensibly its purposes 
mm to bold the island as .security for the preservation 
Of English interests in Korea and to thwart Hussion designs 
in Korean territory. 78 Korea protested against Great 
Britain%  action to tbs Government of the Halted States and 
besought Washington to- use its good offices to bring' about 
an amicable arrangement of the difficulty* 3&e Korean Gov* 
ernment based its plea, on the second part of Article 1 of 
the treaty of 1883, which stated:. "Xf other powers deal 
unjustly or .oppressively with either government, the other 
will arert their good offices,- on being informed of the case, 
to. bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing, their 
friendly feelings.'1 2bis request was refused by Bayard on. 
the ground that af h i & Government could not, of course, con­
strue the engagement thus entered into as empowering or re­
quiring us to decide and maintain that the acts are, in fact,
77, Bennett* Bar-lv American. Bolicy In Korea, p. 100
78. Douglas, Sir Robert Kennaway, "Ihe far East” in
Cambridge Modem History, Vol. XII {H.Y. 1910 
'fae”AHglo-Ki¥iaul,'Hvalry in Asia was very in­
tense during this period due to the imperial­
istic policies being pursued by both countries.
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unjust or oppressive* Such a construction would naturally 
render nugatory any attempt to derive good results from the 
engagement.n
In January 1887, Great Britain evacuated Port Hamilton 
as a result of an agreement made with China which guaranteed 
the security of the island from seizure by any other power*80
The Chinese evidently feared the results of foreign 
penetration into Korea# Yuan-Shi-Kai presented a memorial 
to the King of Korea to the effect that the mint should be 
condemned, expressed his disapproval of the opening of an 
American mission hospital, and decried the establishment of 
a model farm and the purchase of a steamer by the Korean Gov-* 
ernment* The significance of the proclamation lies in the 
fact that the mint, hospital, and farm had all been inaugu­
rated under American missionary auspices or with American 
missionary help# The missionaries recognizing that China 
would endeavor to thwart their efforts now became hostile to
Chinese Influence* from this time forward the government
81which favored them was the one that they upheld* Tuan
70* MOore, op. cit.» p. 871
Francis Wharton, Digest of International Law, 
{Washington, 1887},p, 442.
Lester B* Shlppee, Thomas Francis Bayard in 
American Secretary*s of State, Vol.Vlil, S.F. 
Beals, Editor, In T y . 1928, p* 85.
80. Foreign Relations* (1887), p* 255.
81* Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p.* 570-71
further urged the king to rely solely on the help of China 
which alone could proteet Korea from the insulting treatment 
of foreign nations. To bring Korea more into China*s range, 
he also suggested that the Korean Government should abolish 
three of its six battalions stationed in Seoul. These demands 
were not aeeeaded to. 32
In September 1887, Korea appointed an envoy to the United 
States, but the Chinese Government Interfered before he could 
be sent abroad. Yuan-Shl-Kai delivered a sharp rebuke to the
Korean Government for presuming to act in such a manner with-
S3out the consent of China. Dinsmore, Foulk's successor in
Korea, protested to Yuan-Shi-Kai that the course of the
Chinese Government was "surprising" and that the American-
Korean treaty expressly stated the rights of each government
to send diplomatic representatives to the other country. He
summarizes the American position quite clearly:
"Such a course on the part of the Chinese Government 
could not but be surprising, when we consider that
82. Foreign Relations, op. clt. p. 856.
83* Foreign Relations. (1888), p. 434
Tuan-Shi-aai to the Korean Government, Sept. 23, 
1887: "I have received by telegram, through
Tsung-Li-Yamen (Chinese foreign office! the fol­
lowing imperial order: "Corea is sending minis­
ters to foreign countries. She has certainly 
first to ask our permission, and after getting 
it, to send them.This would be the way for a dependant state to 
act. Let the Korean Government know this as soon 
as possible, so that it may be able to act in ac­cord with the imperial policy."
the treaty between the United States and Gorea, 
largely brought about through the instrumentality of 
his excellency, the Viceroy Li Hung Chang, to whom 
all its terms were fully known, expressly provides 
that ’the high contracting powers may each appoint 
diplomatic representatives to reside at the court 
of the other, and may each appoint consular repre­
sentatives at the ports of the other which are open 
to foreign commerce at their own convenience.*"
Secretary Bayard regretted the stand taken by the 
Chinese Government. However, on mature consideration, China 
decided to allow the Korean envoys to go to the United States 
on the consideration that they would present themselves to 
the Chinese Minister in Washington and be introduced by him 
to the foreign office; that the Korean envoys would yield 
precedence to the Chinese Minister on all oocasions; and 
that he would always confer with the representative of China 
on all important matters. This the Government of Korea re­
fused to stand for and on November 13, 1887, their represen­
tatives sailed from Chemulpo on board the 0, S. s. Gseipee.
On their way out of the harbor they passed six Chinese men 
of war sent to stop them but the fact that they were on an 
American war vessel prevented them from doing so. They 
arrived in Washington on January 9, 1888, and presented 
their credentials to the President without any interference
84. Ibid, p. 435
85. Senate Doc. 109. 67th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 12
from the Chinese Minister. The attitude of the American 
Government was suceintly stated by Bayard when he declared: 
"Therefore as the United States has no privity with the 
inter-relations of China and Corea, we shall treat both as 
separate governments Customarily represented here by their
o nrespective and independent agents.”
The activities of the American missionaries were thought 
by the Korean Government to be m  direct contrast to the 
conditions under which they had been admitted to the country. 
They were allowed to practice medicine, establish schools 
and hospitals, and to preach the gospel, but they were not 
supposed to interfere in the internal affairs of the kingdom. 
Since Yuan-Shi~Kai*e memorial* previously referred to, they 
had been hostile to Chinese influence in Korea. Therefore, 
the Korean Foreign Office protested to the American Minister, 
Dinsmore, that the missionaries were subordinating their 
humanitarian purposes to those of a political nature. As 
Yuan-Shi-Eai was the ranking Chinese official in Korea at 
this time and as he had little use for missionaries, it is
86. Richardson, 0£. cit. VIII, p. 782
Cleveland to Congress, December 3, 1888:
”A diplomatic mission from Korea has been received, 
and the formal intercourse between the two coun­
tries contemplated by the treaty of 1882, is now 
established.”
87 • fforoi&h Relations, (1888) p. 443 Moore, op. cit. pp. 571-72
very probable that he was behind the protest* Dinsmore for­
warded the complaint to Bayard who upheld the contention of 
the Korean Government and, in reply, addressed a note to 
Dinsmore notifying him of the views of the American Govern­
ment on the subjeot. 88 This action by Bayard tended to les­
sen the activities of the missionaries for the moment but in 
the following decade their policy of interference was again 
to be a cause for protest— this time on the part of the Amer­
ican Government. It should be kept in mind that under the 
treaty of 188£, the American missionaries in Korea enjoyed 
only the rights which belonged to all other American citizens.
Conditions remained quiet in Korea until 1893 but in 
that year another insurrection took place* Again the purpose 
of the revolt was the driving out of the Japanese. The at­
tacks were directed principally against the subjects of the
OS* Foreign Relations. op cit. p. 447.
Bayard to Dinsmore, June 15, 1888:
"In dealing with a country like Corea, where the 
traditional policy for centuries has been the ex­clusion of all intercourse and influence, the 
change which has taken place within the last few years, and the entrance of Corea into the modern 
family of natio xs, necessarily involves large consequences. And while those Who are engaged 
in the effort to implant now principles that 
are largely animated with the desire to accom­plish much for the cause which they represent, 
yet it should be remembered that the attempt on 
their part to extend their privileges by acts of 
aggression, without due regard to treaty limita­tions and the feelings of the people, might tend 
to defeat their efforts and to raise opposition 
to their labors."
Mikado who were resident in Seoul. As a result of this,
Japanese troops were landed on the eoast to protect the
interests of their nationals. Fearing the effects of a
Japanese occupation, the Chinese Government also rushed in
soldiers. The King of Korea became alarmed and begged the
Chinese soldiers to leave, but they refused to do so as
long as the Japanese remained. The latter refused to budge
89until the Chinese left. The result was a deadlock.
The American Government notified Minister Sill to use 
every possible effort for the preservation of peaceful con­
ditions. Sill replied saying that he was doing as much as he 
possibly could in that direction and pointed out the stale­
mate caused by the intentions of both the Chinese and Japan­
ese troops to remain in the country. He recognized the dan­
ger in the situation and suspected an "ulterior purpose" on 
the part of the Japanese. Japan seemed to desire war and
90Sill further stated that the Integrity of Korea was menaced.
The Korean Government now appealed directly to Washington 
through its representative there, Mr. Ye-Sung-Soo. He was 
requested to ask the Government of the United States "to 
Instruct its representatives in China, Japan, and Korea to 
use their efforts in averting any conflict," and"to facili­
tate the withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops from 
91the kingdom." Secretary Gresham acceded to the request
89• Foreign Relations, (1894), pp. 13-21 90. Ybid,p. 22
91* Foreign Relations. (1Q94) p. 30
insofar as be was able to and, In an interview with, the 
Japanese Minister to the United States, he expressed the 
hope that Japan would deal kindly and fairly with her help­
less neighbor. She Minister answered that his government 
rdcognized the independence of Korea and was not seeking 
its territory, but that Japanese troops would not be with­
drawn until needed reforms in the domestic administration 
had been made. 92
On July 23, 1894, the Japanese troops took possession 
of the royal palace in Seoul. Two days later, a guard from 
the U. S. S. Baltimore was despatched to Seoul for the pur­
pose of proteeting the American legation. Chi August 1, 1894, 
Denby cabled Gresham that war had been declared between Japan 
and China and that the Japanese charge d*affaires in Peking
had left, placing the interests of Japanese subjects in
93charge of the American legation.
The great powers of Europe now began to take an active 
interest in the approaching conflict. Due to their varied 
interests it is entirely probable that they desired to be 
on the ground In order to share in the spoils should the 
opportunity arise. At any rate, on October 6, 1894, the
92. Montgomery Schuyler, Walter Quintin Gresham in
American Secretary*s of State, 3* F. hexals. 
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93. Foreign Relations, (1894) pp. 40-43
British representative in Washington asked the.United States
Government to join with England, France* Germany and Russia
and intervene in the struggle between China and Japan, The
basis of such an intervention would be that the independence
of Korea would be guaranteed by the powers and that Japan
should receive an indemnity for the expenses of the war*
The President of the United States declined to act jointly
with the powers but offered to aet singly if called upon by
94the warring nations.
On November 3, 1884, the Tsung-Li-Yamen proposed to 
Denby that China would seek peace on the basis that "Japan 
should remove her troops from Manchuria, and China agrees 
that Korea* in future, shall be independent... Denby for­
warded this information to Gresham who cabled back that the 
President was ready to tender his good offices to bring the 
war to a close, (hi November 23, Denby sent the following 
message to Gresham: "Yesterday China made through me direct
overtures for peace; basis, independence Korea; war indemnity
94* Foreign "‘Relations* {1894} p. 70.
Richardson, ojd. cit. IX, p* 525.
Cleveland in his 2nd Annual Message to Congress on 
December 3, 1804: "Acting under a stipulation in
our treaty with Korea{the first concluded with a 
western power), I felt constrained at the beginning 
of the controversy to tender our good offices to 
Induce an amicable arrangement of the difficulty 
growing out of the Japanese demands for administra­
tive reforms in Korea, but the unhappy precipitation 
of actual hostilities defeated this kindly purpose."
95« Foreign Relations, (1894) pp. 75-81.
However, Japan was not yet ready to atop fighting.
The war had been one long string of successes for her and 
defeats for China* On August 26, 1894, Korea and Japan had 
signed a treaty of alliance the object of vhieh was the main­
tenance of Korean independence and the promotion of Korean 
and Japanese Interests by the expelling of the Chinese from 
Korean territory. It also stated: "Korea will undertake
to give every possible facility to Japanese soldiers regard-
96ing their movements and supply of provisions."
This treaty of alliance shows that Japan had at last 
obtained the upper hand in Korea that she had so ardently 
desired. She was using her war with China as a pretext to 
derive the full benefit of her territorial ambitions on the 
mainland of Asia. This treaty m s  to be but the first step 
in the culmination of her future plans.
Hostilities continued until April 17, 1895 and were 
not stopped until the despatch of Li Hung Chang to Japan as 
China's official representative to negotiate for a treaty 
of peace, This was accomplished at Shimoneseki, Japan on 
April 17, 1895.
Under the terms of this treaty, the independence of 
Korea was recognised by both countries; China was to cede to 
Japan a part of Fongtisn Province, Formosa, and the Pescadore
96. John V. A* Maoliurray, Treaties and Agreements with 
and Concerning China. "(W, Y* 1921), Vol. 1, 
p * 24 •
Islands; China agreed to pay an indemnity of 200*000,000 
taels; all the old treaties between China and japan were 
abrogated; new localities were to be opened in China to 
Japanese trade; and Japanese were to continue in the occu­
pation of Wei-Hai-Wei.--until the -stipulations demanded in 
the treaty were paid or enforced*
By her defeat of China and the relative ease with Which
it was accomplished, Japan became recognized as something
more than just an oriental nation. It had learned the arts
of war and civilization in thirty-four years and* when the
time came, knew how to use them. This war also dispelled
the idea that China might be counted on in the future as a
great military power and showed the real weaknesses of the
*
Celestial Kingdom.
Ihe Sino-Japaneee War also settled the status of Korea 
once and for all, as far as China was concerned. However, 
the triumphant position of Japan brought a new danger to 
the fore. ©ie proximity of the peninsula kingdom to Japan 
and its immediate strategic importance made it imperative 
that Japan ,would eventually strive for full possession* As
N.
97 • Foreign Relations. 1895-96), pp. 190-203 
HacMurray„ op. cTt,, pp. 18-24,
"China recognised definitely the full and complete 
independence and autonomy of Korea, and in conse­
quence the payment of tribute and the performance 
of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China in 
derogation of such independence and autonomy shall 
wholly cease for the future.”
it was she had the real control of Korean affairs for the 
time being. We have noticed to what extent Japanese author­
ity predominated in the Korean-Japanese treaty of alliance 
of August 27, 1894. However, she was not to have complete 
control,, as yet, because of the machinations of Russia in 
the same territory that she was interested in.
In the same year as the treaty of Shimoneseki, Germany, 
Russia, and Prance presented a joint request that Japan with­
draw from the Liaotung peninsula; that she return Port Arthur
to China; and that she make oertaln speedy evacuation of 
98Wei-Hai-Wei* This shows quite clearly how the European 
powers looked on Japan— still as a backward nation and with­
out the realization that she had just about come of age*
Two notable exceptions to this demand were Great Britain and 
the Uhited States. The United States was not Interested 
enough while England was evidently lying low— and thinking.
It must be remembered that at this time England was practi­
cally alone in Europe and without any significant treaties 
with the other powers. It is highly probable that she had 
in mind, even then, her .future alliance with Japan.
Although Japan had inserted the clause dealing with the 
recognition of Korean independence in the treaty of Shimon­
eseki, Minister Sill refused to recognize that the indepen-
98. Dennett, op. cit., p. 503 
Williams, op. cit. p. 363
dence of Korea was something new. The Amorican-Korean 
treaty of 1882, while not specifically stating that Korea 
was an independent country, nevertheless carried that im­
plication# Acting Secretary of State Adee wrote him that 
his action was approved and that “the position assumed by 
this government toward Korea since contracting the treaty 
with it in 1882 has in no wise been affected by recent events. 
Korean treaty independence since then has been for us an
onestablished and accepted fact.”
In the latter part of 1895, the ex-regent, Tai-Wen-Kun 
returned to Korea. He immediately stirred up a revolt and 
with the assistance of the Japanese captured the royal 
palace and murdered the queen. Acting Minister Allen in 
Seoul telegraphed to American Minister Dun in Tokyo that 
the “Murderers were Japanese In civilian dress” 100 A de­
tachment of marines were ordered to the capital from the
tf. s. S. Yorktown, the Russian charge also called for marines,
101and the British Minister requested a war vessel. The ex­
regent proceeded to make many changes in the administration 
and gave important government offices to Koreans who were
99• Foreign Relations. {1895-96, p. 971.
Senate Poo. 109. 67th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 37. 
101. Ibid, p. 37.
102friendly to Japan. So much trouble was created that the 
Japanese representative, Viscount Miura, and officers of 
his legation and of the Japanese army in Korea were sent 
back to Japan. Miura was courtmartialled for complicity 
in the revolt but was not punished* The King of Korea was 
under strict duress and his life m s  considered imperiled* 
Sill wrote that "I do not recognize decrees forced from 
him." 103
Minister Sill went away on leave for a short time and 
his secretary, Mr. H. H. Allen, was left in control of the 
legation at Seoul. He was in a quandary as to whether or 
not he should recognize the government of Tai when his 
method of assuming control was considered. On Sill’s re­
turn, the Minister immediately began to meddle in the af­
fairs of the native government to such an extent that Olney 
cabled him "Intervention in political concerns of Korea 
not among your functions, and is forbidden in diplomatic 
Instructions" and later "Confine yourself strictly to pro­
tection of American citizens and interests. You have no 
concern in internal affairs. Your actions to be taken in­
dependently of other representatives unless otherwise instruc 
ted." 104
102* Senate Doc.. 109* op. cit., p. 37.
foreign Relations* {1895-96, pp. 972-73.
104. Ibid, p. 973.
On December X, 1895, due to local troubles, some 
Koreans fled to the American Legation and put themselves 
under the protection of Sill. Sill cabled to Olney asking 
him for authority to send them away from Korea on the U. S. 
S. Yorktown which was to leave Chemulpo for Shanghai. These 
men had risen against the de-facto government of Tai and, 
in trying to capture the royal palace, had been repulsed 
and pursued. Olney*s reply to Sill's request was sharp and 
to the point:
"Refugees cannot be sheltered by you against officers 
of de facto government charged with apprehending them 
as violators of the laws of their country. Use of 
Yorktown in manner suggested is wholly inadmissable.
Bie Department sees with disfavor your disposition 
to forget that you are not to interfere with local 
concerns and politics of Korea, but are to limit 
yourself strictly to the care of American interests."
Sill continued his questionable methods apparently 
impervious to the orders of the Secretary of State. He 
remained interested in the doings of the Korean authorities 
and backed up his fellow-countrymen— mostly missionaries—  
who seemed bound to interfere in matters outside of their 
jurisdiction. Many of these people contributed to the 
hopes of the Koreans that they would receive help from the
105* Foreign Relations* (1895-96), p. 974,
tUnited States in their opposition to Japan, They seemed 
to forget that they might be raising issues for which the 
United States Government would be held responsible. Both 
Sill and the members of the American colony consistently 
refused to accept the fact that our government had no in­
terest in the internal affairs of the kingdom. Affairs 
reached such a state that Olney was again forced to adminis­
ter rebukes to Sill, Bis course ms "noted with astonish-
10?ment end emphatic disapproval.” The upshot of Sill's
106# Dennett, America in Bastern. Asia, p. 571.
/As the Korean'''GoveriSent' became more friendly 
toward the missionaries!]
"The missionaries repaid the confidence with a sturdy and characteristically American sup­
port of Korean claims to defacto as well as 
de jure independence. This support was* in time,' a great encouragement to the Koreans.
It encouraged them to oppose Ynan-Shi-Kai 
in the period preceding the Sino-Japanese 
War, and it was an even greater encouragement to the opposition which arose against the intri­
gues of Japan and Russia in the years that fol­
lowed, That it misled the Korean people into 
the assumption that the American Government would, in some time of emergency, intervene 
and assume protectorate functions over the peninsula, there can be little doubt.
107. Foreign Relations, (1895-96) pp. 975-70 
Olney to' Sill', January 10, 1896:
•Tour course in continual intermeddling with 
Korean political affairs in violation of re­
peated instructions noted with astonishment and emphatic disapproval. Cable briefly any 
explanation you have to make; also answer 
whether you intend to comply with instructions 
or not."
Olney to Sill, January 11, 1896:
"In your number 17? you state that the Americans
continual disobeyance of orders from the Department of State 
was his recall and the elevation of the Secretary of Lega­
tion, Mr. Horace N.'Allen, to the post of Minister-Resident. 
The policy that Allen was to purs us was clearly stated 
by Secretary of State John Sherman in his instructions to 
him on July 27,* 1897:
YYou have been appointed to this interesting mission 
at a time when there is reason to believe that rival 
purposes and Interests in the east may find in Korea 
a convenient ground of contention, and it behooves 
the United States and their representatives, as ab­
solutely neutral parties, to say or do nothing that
107 (continued)
now resident in Seoul are exposed to much danger, 
apparently by reasons of the anti-Japanese opin­
ions to which they have openly given voice and 
their indiscreet expressions of sympathy for the 
party opposed to Japanese Influence. You should, 
on receipt of the present instructions, inform all 
American residents in Korea that they should strict­
ly refrain from any expression of opinion, or from 
giving advice concerning the internal management 
of the country, or from intermeddling in political 
questionsj that if they do so it is at their own 
risk and peril; that neither you or the Government 
of the United States can approve of such action 
on their part or perhaps be adequately able to pro­
tect them 3hould they dlsroagard this adviee. They 
should strictly confine themselves to their mission­
ary work, whether it be teaching schools, preaching 
the gospel, or attending to the sick, for which they 
went to the country. Use such other arguments as 
you properly can to discourage and stop, if possible, 
the habit which has steadily increased since the 
arrival of American citizens in Korea, of irrespon­
sible persons advising and attempting to control, 
the Government of the country.”
108. Minister Allen, altho a pioneer missionary himself, 
succeeded in keeping that class in Its proper place 
with the result that complaints about them were 
practically stopped from this time forward.
can in any way be construed as taking sides with 
or against any of the interested powers* And 
such particularity would not only be in itself 
improper but m-Lght have the undesirable and un­
fortunate effect of leading the Koreans themselves 
to regard the United States as thoir natural and 
only ally for any and all such purposes of domes­
tic policy as Korean rulers may adopt*”
• On May 10, 1898, a HuSsian-Japanese convention was 
signed which was of great importance to Korea. Both govern­
ments agreed to recognise the national rights and complete 
independence of that country and to abstain from interfer­
ence in the internal affairs of the kingdom. They also agreed 
that "in case Korea asks either Japan or Russia for a&yice and 
assistance, the two governments will take no steps whatever 
by way of appointing military instructors or financial ad­
visers, unless negotiations to that effect have been opened 
and settled beforehand.” Furthermore, the Russian Government 
recognised the preponderance of Japanese interests in the 
kingdom and promised not to obstruct the commercial and indus­
trial interests existing between Japan and Korea. This
convention can readily be used as an indication of Japan's 
aims in Korea. She was constantly strengthening her position 
in the peninsula and her agreement with Russia was only a
*-09» Korea Instructions. Vol. 1, November 19, 1897, quoted in Dennett, T., Americana in Eastern 
Asia, pp. 505-06.
110o Foreign Relations* (1898) p. 475.
recognition of her actual position there.
Sherman’s instructions to Allen proved to h© quite
prophetic but, instead of Korea being affected, it was
China for the time being. Germany started the big parade by
occupying Kiachou in March 1898. Later in the same month
Bussia occupied Port Arthur and Talien-wan; in April and
June the British occupied Wei-Hai-Wei and Mirs Bay, Deep
Bay, and adjacent islands near Hongkong; and in April, the
111French occupied Kwangchau Bay in southwest China. This 
grab by the European powers showed very clearly in what dir­
ection their spheres of interest lay. The French were stren­
gthening their hold on Tonkin; the British were consolidating 
their position in Hongkong and had also acquired in Wei-Hai- 
Wei a naval base on the north China Coast that is still in 
use today; the Germans had definitely entered the colonial 
field in the Far East*, and Russia had achieved an all year 
round open water terminal in Port Arthur. The Bussia acqui­
sition is of the highest importance for it brought that coun­
try into still closer relations with Korea. Already the 
boundaries of the two countries converged on the north and 
now Russia was entrenched on the tip of the Llatung peninsula 
in still closer proximity to Korea proper. Russia also re­
ceived the right to erect fortifications and naval depots 
and to construct a branch line from the main trans-Manchurian
111* Foreign Relations, (1898) pp. 18S**191.William loodviilo Rookhill, Treaties and Conventions 
with and Concerning China~ancf Koreal89 4-1904, 
(Washington, 1904)pp. 45-62.
railway she had built to both of her new acquisitions*
Japan, who had won Port Arthur from China and had then been 
forced to give it back, viewed the presence of Russia in her 
new footholds with deep concern. From now on, she looked 
upon Russia as her chief enemy with reference to Korea*
On October, 1897, the King of Korea changed his title 
to that of Emperor. His reason for doing so was to elevate 
himself to a dignity comparable with that of iiio neighbors, 
the Emperors of Japan and China. On September 11, 1899,
treaty relations were resumed between China and Korea after 
a lapse of five years. Shis treaty was practically the same 
as the Ameriean-Korean agreement of 1882.
For several years after this Korea was peaceful. How­
ever, on January 30, 1902, Great Britain aad Japan signed 
a treaty of alliance that was destined to play an important 
rolo in the future of Korea* The first article of the ‘Treaty 
defines the respective spheres of interact of each of the 
contracting powers and is therefore quoted in full:
"The High Contracting Parties having mutually 
recognised the independence of China and Corea, 
declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by 
any aggressive tendencies in either country. Hav­
ing in view, however, their special interests, 
of which those of Great Britain relate, princi­
pally to China, while Japan, in addition to the 
interests which oho possess in China, is interested
112* Foreign Relations* (1898) pp. 484-87.
1*15• Foreign Relations, (1899) pp. 492-96*
In a peculiar degree politically as well as corona r- 
cially and industrially in Corea, the High Contract­
ing Parties recognize that it will he admissable for 
either of them to take such measures as may be in­
dispensable in order to safeguard those interests 
if threatened either by the aggressive action of 
any other Power* or by disturbance arising either 
in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervene 
tion of either of the High Contracting parties for 
the protection of the lives and property of its sub­jects*” -**14
This alliance was undoubtedly aimed at Russia and it
Was tho moans of bringing together two powers in a similarly
isolated position for the purpose of maintaining their pre- 
Sant possessions in the East and to strike for more when 
the opportunity would arise. Article III made the signifi­
cant declaration that in case of hostilities the two powers 
would join forces and not make peace separately. From now 
on, Japan felt herself in a stronger position.
On March 5, 1903, The Chinese Eastern Railway was com­
pleted as far as Mukden. This was an all Russian owned rail­
road which entered from Siberia and traversed Manchuria. Con­
sul Miller at Hieuchang, Manchuria reported that: "Surveys
are under way for an extension of the Russian railway system
into Korea, and it is rumored that construction will not be
115long delayed." This project m s  bound to arouse the fur­
ther apprehension of Japan for the Russian advance clearly 
showed what their aims were. After Manchuria would come
114* MacMurray, oj>. Cit., pp. 324-335
115. Foreign Relations. 1903, p. 49.
eo.
Korea, a glance at the map of the Far Fast will suffice 
to show the importance of Korea’s geographical position.
It is clear that occupation of the country by any power 
carries with It facilities for domination of the waters of 
the Far Fast* The Japanese}, therefore, could not view with 
other than the utmost alarm the prospect of their neighbor 
falling a prey to Russian aggression. Japan therefore made 
haste to propose to Russia that Chinese sovereignty be 
maintained; that Russia evacuate the country but retain all 
rights that she had acquired through treaties and conventions 
already published; and that.Russia should recognize Japan’s 
paramount Interest as stated in the Japanese-English treaty 
of 1902* 116 Negotiations were carried forward but not fast 
enough to suit Japan. The latter country realised the men­
ace of Russian penetration into Manchuria and considered
the independence of Korea absolutely essential to the com-
11?fort and safety of her empire.
In the meantime* the feeling in both countries became 
somewhat hostile. A wave of anti-Russian feeling spread 
through the Japanese press. In December 1903, Japan again 
put the question before Russia and also stated that it would 
not wait more than a reasonable length of time for a reply 
on the ground that protracted negotiations would rebound to
116. Foreign Relations. (1903) p. 616.
117, Ibid., p. 618.
the military advantage of Russia. In the words of the
American representative to Japan: "War seemed imminent
1X8unless Russia receded from her position."
Russia did reply by advancing the proposition that
a neutral zone be created in northern Korea and that Japan
should recognize that Manchuria was outside her sphere of
Interest. As this was unsatisfactory, war was declared by
Japan on February 10, 1905. The Japanese position was
stated as follows:
"The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant 
concern to this Empire, not only because of 
our traditional relations with that country, but 
because the separate existence of Korea is es* 
sential to the safety of our realm. Nevertheless, 
Russia in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurances to other 
powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria and 
has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon 
those provinoes and is bent upon their final annexation. And since the absorption of Manchuria 
by Russia would render it impossible to maintain 
the integrity of Korea and would, in addition, 
compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in 
the extreme East, we determined in those circum­
stances to settle the question by negotiation and 
secure thereby permanent peace.
"...the safety of Korea is in danger; the vital 
interests of our Empire are menaced." 119
Immediately after the declaration of war between the
two powers, the United States proclaimed Its neutrality.
On February 20, 1914, President Roosevelt sent a note to
' ? o 'y, .
Russia and Japan cautioning them to respect the neutrality 
120of Ohina. Dennett comments that "it is significant
118. Ibid., p. 622
Japan Dally Times. Tokyo, February 11, 1904, 
quoted in Foreign Relations. 1904, p. 414
120. Foreim  Relat1ons, 1904, p. 2
that thus at the very beginning of the war the American
Government showed its concern for China and at the same
121time made no mention of Korea.** on February 22, 1904,
Japan entered into an alliance with Korea and took over some 
of the ports and other portions of the country with a view 
to facilitating military operations* This was supposedly 
done "with the full knowledge and consent of Korea and not 
in disregard or violation of her independence or territor­
ial integrity. "This was to be reciprocated by Korea agree­
ing to adopt the advice of Japan in regard to improvements
122in administration?
This was the first of the indirect measures taken by 
Japan which was to eventually lead to the annexation of 
Korea . Marquis Ito was sent to Seoul in March 1904 as the 
representative of his country and was responsible for the 
Japanese-Korean agreement of August of that year whereby 
Japan was assured control of the foreign and financial af­
fairs of that country. Korea was also to consult the Japanese 
Government before concluding treaties and conventions with
foreign powers and all other diplomatic affairs dealing with 
123foreigners.
121. Dennettj Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 28 
Foreign Relations. {1904}, p. 437
123. Ibid, p. 439.
The attitude taken by the Japanese was causing serious 
concern to the Emperor of Korea. Allen telegraphed to 
Secretary Hay on April 14, 1904, that the Emperor was look­
ing towards America for assistance and that "he |the Bmperoij 
confidently expects that America will do something for him 
at the close of this war, or when opportunity offers, to 
retain for him as much of his independence as is possible.
He is inclined to give a very free and favorable translation 
to Article I of our treaty of Jenohuan of 1882. I trust 
to be able to prevent a direct invocation of this treaty, 
however, though I am obliged to assure His Majesty that the 
condition of Korea is borne in mind by the United States
Government, who will use their good offices when occasion 
124occurs."
That Korea was being intimidated is clearly shown in 
the despatches from the American Minister at Seoul to the 
Department of State. Although we had full knowledge of what 
was going on our position was one of strict neutrality.
In August 1905, Great Britain and Japan renewed their 
treaty of alliance of 1902. It reaffirmed Japan’s paramount 
interests in Korea by emphasizing the point more strongly. 
Lord Landsowne, the British Foreign Minister, in transmit­
ting to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg the contents 
of the new agreement, said;
124. Senate Doc. 542. 64th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 12-13
"Article III, dealing with the question of Corea, 
is deserving of special attention. It recognizes 
in the clearest terras the paramount position 
which Japan at this moment occupies and must hence­
forth occupy in Corea, and her right to take any 
measures which she may find necessary for the 
protection of her political, military# and econ­
omic interests in that country....It has, however, 
become evident that Corea# owing to.its close prox­
imity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to 
stand alone, must fall under the control and tute­
lage of Japan.” -L2§
This document inevitably pointed to the annexation of 
Korea by Japan. This statement is further strengthened 
when one considers that by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 
1902 the two Powers bound themselves to recognize the inde­
pendence of Korea whereas in the renewal of 1905 this stip­
ulation was omitted.
Before the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
President Hoosevelt, in an effort to bring the Russo- 
Japanese War to a close, offered his good offices to the 
belligerents. To this proposal both countries agreed and on 
September 5, 1905, they concluded a treaty of peace at 
Portsmouth, Hew Hampshire. By this treaty, Russia agreed 
to recognize Japan’s predominant position in Korea and not
to interfere in any way with whatever the Japanese might do
126in that country* t'~\
On November 17, 1905, Japan and Korea concluded an­
other agreement by means of which Japan assumed complete
125. MacMurray, o£. cit.. pp. 518-19.
I26* foreign Relations. (1905) pp. 807-28.
control of Korean, foreign affairs and Korean interests in
foreign countries* This resulted in the withdrawal of
the American Minis ter-Resident to Korea by Secretary Root
and the leaving of a consul-general.in charge. All direct
diplomatic representation was to be carried on through the
American Minister in Tokyo. By the withdrawal of the
American Minister, the United States gave its sanction to
the privileged position of Japan in the peninsula* in
December 1905, the Korean legation and consulates in the
United States were withdrawn and their powers and functions
127transferred to the Japanese.
It must not be supposed that the Koreans endured all 
this without protest. There were many riots and outbreaks 
occasioned by the methods the Japanese were using to control 
the country, but to no avail* The Government of the United 
States was fully cognizant of what was going on. In October, 
1905* before the protectorate was assumed, Minister Morgan 
wrote to the State Department that "The Emperor confides to 
me that the Japanese representative is pressing him to ar­
range a protocol by which Japan assumes the complete pro­
tection of Korea. Although unwilling to do this he may ul-
1S8timately be constr^ned to agree..."
127. Ibid., pp. 612-16
128. Sen. Poo. 542* 64th Congress, 1st Session* p* 15.
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On October 19, the Korean Emperor despatched an 
American, Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, to the United States 
Government to plead against the harsh measures being taken 
by Japan. He was to ask for the intercession of the United 
States under the "good offices” clause of the treaty of 
1882. He also carried a personal letter fromTEmperor of 
Korea to the President of the United States. Before leav­
ing, Mr. Hulbert saw Minister Morgan and told him-of his 
plans. When Hulbert arrived in Washington he was refused 
admittance to President Roosevelt and directed to the De­
partment of State. He Was told that they were too busy 
there to see him. Hie next move was to go back to the White 
House again and here-he was told that they knew the contents 
of the letter but that it would have to be handled by the 
State Department. As Hulbert says: "That very day* ^hile
still holding the message from the Emperor in abeyance, the
129. Herbert Croly, Willard Straight. (H. Y. 1925, p.
177. Shortly before this, Mr.Nicholas Longworth, 
Miss Alice Roosevelt, United states Senator How­
lands of Nevada, and soma other Americans had 
visited Seoul. The Emperor had asked fir. Hewland 
for advice and, in the words of Will&rd Straight: 
"The Emperor was advised by the Senator to engage 
the services of an international lawyer and to 
make a dignified protest. This didn*t please 
him and nothing more was said until two days ago 
when he sent in word that he had a letter that 
he wanted sent to the President. [Probably refers 
to the letter that Hulbert carried on his mission. 
Morgan refused to have anything to do with it. Ito 
had arrived and the Chances were ten to one that 
in the same breath he had sent a message to the 
Japanese saying that they could have anything they 
wanted "
administration accepted as true tlie Japanese statement 
that the new arrangement was very pleasing to the Korean 
people* and without a word from the Korean Emperor or the
Korean legation in S'/ashington, it cabled our legation to
„ _ 130remove from Korea*
Mr. Hulbert was admitted the following day and Secre­
tary Root received his letter but stated that it came too
131late to be considered. On the next day* Mr. Hulbert re­
ceived the following cablegram from the Emperor of Korea:
”1 declare that the so-called treaty of protectorate 
recently concluded between Korea and Japan was ex-
130. Congressional Record. Vol 58, Part 7, 66th Con­
gress,’ 1st Session, 1919, p. 6815.
131* Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, 
pp. 304*1n "Mr* Hulbert, trailed by Japanese 
Decteetives, reached Washington late in November, 
He had an interview with Secretary Root but was 
unable personally to deliver the Emperor^ let­
ter to President Roosevelt. The letter was, how­
ever, placed before the President and the latter 
wrote to Root, on November 25, 1905, as follows: 
rI have carefully read the letter of the Korean 
Emperor handed to you by Mr. Hulbert, an American 
long resident in Korea, to whose hand this letter 
had been intrusted* I understand from you that 
the Korean representatives here, so far as you 
know, are unacquainted With the existence of such 
a letter and that Br. Hulbert understands that 
it is the wish of the Emperor that the existence 
of the letter should be kept secret and nothing 
said to anyone about it, and particularly not to 
the Japanese. Of course, these facts render it 
impossible for us to treat the letter as aa of­
ficial communication, for there is no way in 
which we could officially act without violating 
what Mr. Hulbert says is the Emperor*s wish. 
Moreover, since the letter was written we have 
been officially notified that the Korean Govern­
ment has made the very arrangement with Japan 
which- lb the letter the Emperor says he does not 
desire to make. All things considered, I do not 
see that any practical action on the letter is 
open to us."
torted at the point of the sword and under 
duress and therefore is null and void. I 
never consented to it and never will. Trans­
mit to the American Government.”
heedless to say,, the cablegram did not receive any con­
sideration. That the State Department was fully aware of 
HulbertTs mission is easily ascertained when one considers 
the note despatched by Minister Morgan to Mr. Hoot on Gotober 
19, 1905, nearly a month before the proclamation of the pro­
tectorate. In this message, Mr. Morgan admits that Mr.
133Hulbert is en route as a representative of the Emperor.
132. Ibid, p. 6815,
135. Senate Doc. 542. 64th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 15.
, Mr. Morgan to Mr. Root, October 19, 1905:
”1 have the honor to inform you that Mr* Homer 
B. Hulbert, an American citizen, who has been 
employed continuously by the Korean Government 
since 1896 as a teacher of English in the middle 
and normal schools of Seoul, will proceed to 
Washington, probably at once, in order to lay 
before the President certain statements which 
he believes should prove that Korea is being dealt with "unjustly and oppressively" by Japan, 
and that In conformity with the second clause 
of Article I of the Koroan-Amerioan treaty of 
1882, this Ciovernment is entitled to call upon 
the United States to exert her “good offices” 
on being informed of the case to bring about 
an amicable arrangement with the power against whose aggressions the Korean Government may 
lodge a protest,
”1 do not know what credentials Mr. Hulbert is 
furnished nor with what authority he speaks, but 
it is not unlikely that the Emperor is acquainted 
with his mission and had supplied him with money 
with which to defray his travelling expenses.
A certain portion of the foreign community sup­
ports his views and will follow his course with 
sympathetic interest.”
On December 19, Mr. Min-Teung-Tciian, a special envoy 
from Korea without credentials, presented himself in 
Washington and protested to Secretary Hoot against the 
Japanese-Korean treaty of November 17, 1905, on the ground 
that it was procured from the Emperor of Korea by duress 
and should therefore be ignored* Hoot considered the pro­
test but could find no justification for interference under 
the treaty of 1882 citing the fact that ho had received 
word from the regular Korean charge d'affaires. Mr. Kim, 
to the effect that the treaty in question was agreeable to 
the Korean Foreign Office and that ho had received orders 
to withdraw the Korean mission and to turn over the archives 
and other property in his charge to the Japanese legation.
Root contended that in view of this official communica­
tion, he could not see how the CJovemment of the United 
States could proceed in any manner upon the different view 
of the facts as presented by Mr. Mln-Yeung-Tchan. He fur­
thered stated the American position by saying:
"If, however, the difficulty of complying with your 
wishes were surmounted, we should be met by tno fact that, on February 2?, 1904, and on August 22, 1904, 
the Korean Government concluded with the Japanese 
Government treaties Which are not now in any respeot 
impeached or questioned, by which Korea gavo to 
Japan such extensive control over her affairs and put 
herself so completely undei the protection of the 
Government of Japan as to render completely Impossible 
the application of the provisions of the treaty with 
the United states above quoted refers to treaty of 
1882. The above mentioned treaties between Japan and 
Korea appear to be of such a character as practically 
to give Japan control over the foreign relations of 
Korea, and to make the latest treaty of November 17,
1905, which is now called in question, but a 
slight advance upon the relations of control 
previously existing. These previous relations 
of control amount to a complete bar to any 
interference by the United States under the 
treaty of 1883." 1,54
The attitude of the United States, therefore, was to 
be on© of complete non-interference with Japanese policy in 
Korea. Marquis Ito admitted that the Koreans were not sat­
isfied with Japanese control but emphatically declared that 
Japan would not let them break away from the Japanese "halter. 
The Koreans felt that they had lost their independence and 
they truly had.
The policy of the Washington Government is strikingly 
shown in the following declaration of President Roosevelt 
to Secretary of State Hay on January 28, 1905. He said:
"We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against 
Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own 
defense*M
The above would appear to be in answer to protests 
received by the United States on the assuming of a protect­
orate in Korea by Japan. That President Roosevelt was an 
ardent admirer of the Japanese at this time is a well known 
fact. On July 29, 1905, Gount Katsura, Japanese Premier and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had a "conversation" with a 
personal representative of President Roosevelt. An agreed
134. Foreign Relations, (1905), pp. 629-30.
135. Theodore Roosevelt, Private Papers, Roosevelt to
Hay, January 28, XO'U'S j"” quoted ’in Dennett, 
Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 110.
memorandum was drawn up which, stated;
"....in regard to the Korean question, Count Katsura 
observed that Korea being the direct cause of our 
war with Russia, it is a matter of absolute impor­
tance to Japan that a complete solution of the pen­
insula question should be made as the logical con- 
sequonco of the war. If loft to herself after the 
war, Korea will certainly draw back to her habit 
of entering into any agreements or treaties with 
other Pov/ers, thus rosuscitating the same intern- 
national complications as existed before the war.
In view of the foregoing circumstances Japan feels 
absolutely constrained to talie come definite step 
with a view to precluding the possibility of Korea 
falling back into her former condition and of 
placing us again under the necessity of entering 
upon another foreign war.
. ....jiftio American) fully admitted the justness of 
the Count’s observations and remarked to the offoct 
that, in his personal opinion, the establishment by 
Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the 
oxtent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign 
treaties \7ithout the consent of Japan m s  the logi­
cal result of the present war and would directly 
contribute to permanent peace in the Bast. His 
judgment was that the President would concur in M s  views In this regard, althougn ho had no authority
to give assurance of this; indeed_________fthe American)
added that ho felt much delicacy in advancing the 
views he did for he had no mandate for the purpose 
from the President.....Ho could not, however, in 
view of Count Kntcura'e courteous desire to discuss the question, decline to express his opinions...”
Although the President's representative had no "mandate"
to discuss his views, nevertheless the memorandum was agreed
to by President Roosevelt. The Japanese reaction to this
135. Harnett, Roosevelt and the Run so-Jap anese I7ar,
For a reproduction of a photostat of this docu­
ment sec Tyler Dennett, President Roosevelt's 
S-aorot Pact with Japan in Current History. October
B W p p T T a r s n
memorandum was one of jubilation and is Tory revealing.
The following is from the Kokumin of October 4* 1905 and 
it is noteworthy that this newspaper was considered as the 
official government organ:
"In fact? it is a Japanese Anglo-Amerlean alliance, 
v/e may be sure that when once ungland became our 
ally* America also would become a party to the 
agreement. Owing to peculiar national conditions 
America cannot make any open alliances, but we 
should bear in mind that America is our ally thc'igh 
bound by no formal treaty: wo firmly believe that 
America, under the leadership of the world states­
man, President Roosovolt, will doal with her 
Oriental problems in cooperation with Japan and 
Great Britain".
America, liko England, did recognize the preponder­
ance of Japan in Korea. On L&rch 8, 1900, Root directed the 
American Ambassador to Japan to inquire if the Japanese Gov­
ernment would acquiesce In the American representative at 
Seoul being styled "agent" as wall as consul-general thus 
following a usual precedent in the case of protected coun­
tries and facilitating business arrangements with the Japan­
ese resident.
The Japanese Government's reply was that it was unwill­
ing to have a consul-general at Seoul styled as an agent on 
the ground that tho agreement between Japan and Korea stip­
ulated that all diplomatic business was to be transacted at 
Tokyo and that consequently all business outsido of his reg-
15?. Tokyo Kokumin, quoted in Dennett, op. cit., p. 115
73.
ular consular duties, would be handled by the Japanese
138Eastdent-General*
In June 1906, the Japanese took over the Korean courts; 
on July 24, 1907, the Government of Korea was notified to • 
appoint as Korean officials, Japanese subjects recommended 
by the resident-general* Rioting continued in Korea and 
the whole world seemed to expect the annexation any day*
It© denied talk of annexation with the evident purpose of 
tempering the blow for the Koreans* He stressed the dangers
of coercion and emphasized the importance of reconciling
139the Koreans to the Japanese regime if possible.
In July 1909, the Japanese took over the administra­
tion of justice and prisons and in June 1910, they succeeded 
to the police powers of Korea* All of these steps had been 
useful as a gradual preparation for the complete, control of 
the country. All of these acts were important steps in the 
transfer to Japan of the real governmental powers in Korea. 
She now had direct control of foreign, military, posts and 
telegraphs, the judiciary and prison and police affairs,
While the Korean Government had to obtain preliminary approv­
al of the reeldent*general in all matters pertaining to the
138. Foreign Relations* (1906), pp. 1033-35*
139. Foreign Relations, <1906), pp* 1036-41*
tWiTT'i 1907 },'~PP* 774-75.
enactment of laws and in all important matters of adminis­
tration.
On August 22, 1910, Korea was formally annexed to 
Japan, It was stated that "His Majesty, the Emperor of 
Korea, makes the complete and permanent session to His Majes­
ty, the Emperor of Japan, of all rights of sovereignty over 
the whole of Korea," All treaties concluded with foreign 
powers ceased to he operative hut those powers which had 
treaties with both Korea and Japan were to have their 
Japanese treaties made applicable to the former country 
wherever "practicable". *40 Thus the diplomatic relations 
of the United States with Korea came to an end.
The Japanese changed the name of the country from
"Kahkoku" (Korea) to Chosen (Morning calm). The former had
been the official designation but the reason for the change
to "Chosen" as the official name of the annexed territory
was that it did not contain as does "Kankoku", any verbal
root signifying "nation" (koku) and implying an independent
141and national existence.
140. Foreign Relations. (1910), p. 682. 
3-41* Foreign Relations. (1910), p. 684.
COBelUSiOft
American diplomatic relations with Korea from I860* the 
year of the General Sherman episode* to 1910* when Korea 
was annexed to Japan* can be said to have been influenced 
wary little by political or commercial considerations. Our 
main reason for seeking relations with Korea was primarily 
to secure a treaty dealing with the relief of shipwrecked 
vessels on the coast of that country. Commercial consider* 
ations were of secondary value as is shown in the instruc­
tions given to Commodore Robert W. Shufeidt relative to the 
negotiations concerning the one and only treaty the TJaited 
States ever had with Korea. As Tyler Bennett* an authority 
on 'far Eastern Affairs* sayst
"It is barely possible that there was for a moment.*, 
a fleeting political interest la Korea among a few 
Americans....This was in 1868. (Refers to Seward * a 
proposed Joint expedition with the French7] Whatever 
the Interest, it was very limited* very secret and 
never reappeared....But there was less interest in 
the far East among Americans in 1882 than there had 
been in 1868* and* so far as the American Government
is concerned, the treaty of 1882 may truly be claimed 
as an act of absent-mindedness*.*." 142 
Carrying the contention forward from 1888 the interest
of the American Government can be said to have become even
less marked. While some of our representatives in the far
East may have shown an interest in the commercial advantages
142. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Bus so-Japanese 
' War, p. 103* 1 ’ ‘
to be derived from Korea, nevertheless, they received no 
encouragement from the home government. EvenjTo^her Govern­
ments such as Great Britain, Japan and Hussla had a definite 
policy in regard to Korea, the same cannot be said for the 
United States. The following, by the Secretary of the 
American Legation to Korea, aptly illustrates our attitude:
"Whatever may have been the policy of Japan and the 
British Government, however, in keeping national 
policy before their representatives’ eyes, the State 
Department confined Itself to general abstractions.
In so remote a spot we only guessed at home policy 
by the daily papers which arrived six weeks to two 
months late, and guided our activities by what the 
editors might think European nations seemed to be 
doing to each other."
The above quotation refers specifically to the period 
from 1896 to 1904* As our Minister was withdrawn in 1905,
It is safe to say that, for the whole period of American 
diplomatic relations with Korea, the American Government had 
very little interest politically in Korea.
Dennett contends that the taproot of American policy 
in Asia Is based on most-favored nation treatment. This 
was, of course, included in our treaty with Korea but its 
significance is unimportant. Korea was an impoverished 
country with little money to spend for any purpose and a pre­
ponderance of American influence there would prove to be 
more embarassing than profitable* After the Japanese, the 
Americans were first on the ground and received preferred
143. William Franklin Sands, Undiplomatic Memories.
(N. Y., 1930} p. 56
locations in the foreign.concessions at the treaty ports
but these were subsequently given up because there was no 
reason for holding them*
However, our commercial interests, though trivial, were
relatively' greater than our political interests. In August
1895, the Korean Government granted a concession to an
American company for the operation of a gold mine In the
northern part of the country, and in April of the following
year, the same concern received the contract for the build-
144ing of a railroad from Seoul to Chemulpo,. The growing 
hostility between the Japanese and the Russians in 1897 
frightened American capital and the railroad contract was 
turned over to the Japanese in the following year.^4® Out­
side of these concessions, American investments were exceed­
ingly small.
144. William Woodvllle Roclchillj Treaties or Conven­
tions with and Concerning China. 1894-1964,! 
(Wash. 1904) pp• 445-47, pp. 450-54.
145. Tyler Dennett., Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 504.
146. Sands, op. cit. pp. 302-203.
"I was told by General Legendre, but have never 
been able to verify it, that the Emperor, wor­
ried by conflicting demands for concessions 
and anxious to secure some arrangement by 
which at least a definite revenue might be se­
cured from natural resources if he.had to alien- 
ate them, sent an offer to Levi P. Morton of 
all gold, copper, coal and other mines;, all 
granite, marble and other quarries; all railway 
construction; all coast fisheries and all tim­
ber lands...all this was to be financed and 
developed by solid American capitalists on a 
business basis, paying a definite revenue and 
royalties to the Crown. I was assured that
147
American trade with Korea was insignificant.
While we had, over the whole period of our relations with 
that country, a relatively greater trade than any Western 
nation except England, it oould not begin to be compared 
with that of China and Japan. The following will give an 
idea of the American share in the Korean trade:
"American trade had reached the total of a little 
more than $9,500,000 in 1897. A certain amount 
of American produce was brought into Korea through Japanese and Chinese sources and the 
American firms in Korea dealt almost exclusively 
through Chinese and Japanese merchants. The 
Decennial Reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs 
for the years 1882 to 1891 show the Americans to 
have had but 2 percent of the import trade at 
Chemulpo (Jenchuan) one of the three Korean ports 
of entry. The bulk of the Korean trade was divided 
between the English and the Japanese with the 
latter steadily gaining the ascendancy.”
Perhaps the real reason for the interest found for 
American capital lay with the Emperor. In almost all the
146. (cont.) the proposition had been seriously 
considered by Morton and ohly dropped because
of the intervention at Washington of an European 
power, by lahose representative it was pointed 
out that such a comprehensive development would 
amount to nothing less than a buffer between 
Russia and Japan {it was meant to be I) and that 
it might draw the United States into a position 
with regard to internal Korean administration 
which our government did not care to assume.... 
apparently our government was quite certain then 
that it wished to assume no such burdensome 
responsibility anywhere and Mr. Morton, so my 
informant said, went no further with it.”
147. Dennett, 0£. oit, p. 580. "...in the four decades
following -ihe close of the American Civil War 
the transpacific trade of the Uhited States 
was of slight importance to the American people.
148. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 582.
Americas enterprises, be was directly interested as a 
shareholder, partner* or owner. Some American money had 
been loaned to the Government also. m e  Emperor, no 
doubt, was quite willing to help build up American influ** 
ence in Korea and thought that this could be accomplished 
through financial channels. Nevertheless, what American 
commercial and financial interest there was in the penin­
sula, it declined steadily with the assumption of power by 
Japan.
The philanthropic interests of Americans were strong.
Of 250 Americans in Korea in 1003, half were connected with
missions. For whatever interests the United States showed
ISOin Korea, the missionaries can be thanked. w Enough has 
been stated about them and their activities to give the 
reader a clear picture of the part they played in moulding 
opinion and of the grave apprehension which they caused 
Bayard and Olney, especially the latter. That they thought 
they were doing right is unquestionable but in their desire
to secure a government in Korea favorable to their inter­
ests they did not seem to realize that they could be a
force for evil as well as for good*
If we glance through the list of men high in the affairs
149* Bennett, Roosevelt and Russo-Japanese War* p. 103 
Rookhiil' op'*' 'cltT. pp. 445-1^r" ' ' " r
150. Bennett, oj). cit., p. 104.
of the Government of the United States, we notice in 
their attitudes toward Korea a tremendous lack of inter­
est on their part* Seward showed the most interest as 
is attested by his proposal to the French that a joint 
expedition be planned. Thanks to the coyness of Hapoleon 
Ill’s Government, this was never consummated. Shufeldt, 
although he was responsible for the treaty of 1802, can 
not be said to have had the enthusiastic support of the 
Department of State. Had he not personally pushed the 
matter the chances are that the contemplated treaty would 
have been dropped. Bayard, in 1885, refused to heed the 
Korean appeal for the use of the "good offices" of the 
American Government as stipulated in the treaty of 1882.
Both Bayard and Olney only showed interest in Korea when 
they had to consider the actions of the missionaries which 
issue was forced upon their attention. In 1904, Roosevelt 
showed more interest in China than in Korea although Korea 
was the country most vitally affected by the Russo-Japanese 
War.' The American State Department,from 1882 to 1907, con­
sistently refused to be bothered when called upon by Korea 
under the treaty of 1882. Furthermore, the withdrawal of 
the American Minister-Resident to Korea in 1905, While the 
country was still considered as an Independent nation showed 
that the American Government was content to let Japan go 
ahead with her projected annexation without a protest of any 
sort. The policy of the United states has been to ignore
81,
the obligations incurred by treaty and a desire to avoid 
any complications which might grow oat of said obligations* 
After all* m  had no- imperialistic 'designs in Koreaj we * 
had ho class clamoring for a commercial or political foot­
hold ; m  had no real and vital interests In the country; 
therefore* the treaty of issa notwi thatandi ng, we had no 
business there* !hust. we departed and left Korea to her 
fate.
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